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An emerging narrative of racial transcendence has taken root in our 
law, politics and public consciousness.1  The end of de jure racial 
discrimination in the United States, coupled with the adoption of equal 
opportunity laws during the Civil Rights Era has fostered an assumption 
shared by many that we now live in a colorblind and, perhaps, post-racial 
society.  America has elected its first African-American President, viewed 
by many as proof that our society has finally moved beyond race.2  Our 
courts have similarly employed a colorblind constitutionalism to disregard 
systemic racism as a relic of times past, while invalidating race-conscious 
attempts to remedy existing racial inequality.3  During the last Supreme 
Court term alone, we have witnessed a disturbing roll back of civil-rights 
gains in the affirmative action,4 voting rights,5 and employment 
discrimination contexts.6 
And yet social and economic disparities based on race persist.  In the 
aftermath of the “Great Recession,” disparities between the rich and poor 
and white and non-white have been exacerbated.  The rate of income 
inequality between the richest Americans and the middle-class and poor has 
eclipsed the previous high set during the Great Depression.7  The wealth 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Christian B. Sundquist, Resisting Post-Oppression Narratives, TIKKUN 
MAGAZINE, Fall 2013, at 39–41. 
 2. See, e.g., John McWhorter, Racism in America is Over, FORBES (Dec. 30, 2008, 
2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2008/12/30/end-of-racism-oped-cx_jm_1230mcwhorter 
.html; see also TERRY SMITH, BARACK OBAMA, POST-RACIALISM, AND THE NEW POLITICS OF 
TRIANGULATION (2012).  
 3. See generally Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Colorblind,” 44 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1991) (arguing that “[a] color-blind interpretation of the Constitution, 
legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and political advantages that whites 
hold over other Americans”); see also IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 158–59 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2006); see also 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 559 (2009) (dismissing systemic racism as a “statistical 
disparity”). 
 4. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (holding that the 
strict scrutiny standard should be applied to race-based admission policies). 
 5. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2630–31 (2013) (holding that the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965 provision setting forth a “coverage formula” was 
unconstitutional). 
 6. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2522–23 (2013) 
(holding that Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles 
of but-for causation); see also Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) 
(offering employers an affirmative defense under Title VII if they do not cause “tangible” 
harm to employees). 
 7. U.S. CONG. J. ECON. COMM., INCOME INEQUALITY AND THE GREAT RECESSION 4 
(2010), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=91975589-
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gap between white and non-white households, similarly, has escalated to its 
highest level in twenty-five years.8  As the degrees of economic inequality 
continue to rise during the current financial storm, so do startling race-
based disparities in a variety of social contexts, including education,9 health 
outcomes,10 and rates of incarceration.11 
The persistence of racial inequality creates a moral dilemma for the 
post-race, colorblind perspective.  Racism, after all, is viewed through this 
lens as aberrational and non-systemic in nature.  The dogged survival of 
race-based disparities, in the wrongly assumed absence of racial 
                                                                                                     
257c-403b-8093-8f3b584a088c (detailing that the share of total wealth enjoyed by the 
richest 10% of Americans increased from 34.6% in 1980 to 48.2% in 2008, while the richest 
1% of Americans saw their wealth skyrocket from 10% of total national income in 1980 to 
21% in 2008).  The Report makes the following stark observation: 
Income inequality peaked prior to the United States’ two most severe economic 
crises—the Great Depression and the Great Recession.  At the peak of the stock 
market bubble that capped the Roaring Twenties, in 1928, the share of income 
accruing to the top decile peaked at 49.3%. The crash that followed set off the 
cascade of events that would ultimately land the United States in the deepest 
recession in history. Nearly 80 years later, on the eve of the Great Recession in 
2007, the share of income held by the wealthiest 10% topped its earlier high 
when it hit 49.7%. 
 8. RAKESH KOCCHAR ET AL., WEALTH GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN 
WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 1–3 (2011) (stating that “inflation-
adjusted median wealth fell by 66% among Hispanic households and 53% among black 
households, compared with just 16% among white households”).  The Pew Research Center 
found that the median wealth of white households is 20 times larger than that of African-
American households, and 18 times larger than that of Hispanic-American households.  Id. 
at 3. 
 9. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAT’L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS & 
NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ACHIEVEMENT GAPS HOW BLACK AND WHITE STUDENTS 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS PERFORM IN MATHEMATICS AND READING ON THE NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 
OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS STATISTICAL ANALYSIS REPORT (2009). 
 10. See David R. Williams & Selina A. Mohammed, Discrimination and Racial 
Disparities in Health: Evidence and Needed Research, 32 J. BEHAV. MED. 20 (2009) 
(outlining disparate health outcomes by race). 
 11. See Huma Khan & Michele McPhee, Obama Defends Criticism of Cambridge 
Police in Arrest of Gates, ABC NEWS (July 23, 2009), http://abcnews. 
go.com/Politics/Story?id=8153681&page=1 (summarizing that while African-Americans 
represent only 13% of the total population in the United States, they configure 55% of the 
total federal prison population); see also Albert R. Hunt, A Country of Inmates, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/us/21iht-letter21.html?pagewanted 
=all&_r=0; see also Louisiana Has Highest Incarceration Rate In The World; ACLU Seeks 
Changes, ACLU (Dec. 11, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/louisiana-has-highest-
incarceration-rate-world-aclu-seeks-changes (stating that 60% of Louisiana prisoners are 
African-American).  
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discrimination, creates tension with the colorblind belief that society has 
achieved a state of post-racial liberal equality. 
Historically, the artifice of “race” evolved to resolve the dilemma 
created when social, economic and legal inequality persists notwithstanding 
society’s professed belief in liberal equality for all persons.  The notion of 
“race” and of “racial difference” developed as a socio-political tool to 
legitimate the existence of social, economic, and legal inequality on the 
grounds of biological inferiority.  A product of the scientific sophistry and 
political exigency that marked early European Modernity, the concept of 
biological difference was relied on for hundreds of years to justify the 
enslavement, genocide and unequal treatment of persons deemed “non-
white.”  In the terrible wake of chattel slavery in the United States and the 
Holocaust of World War II, the Postwar World rejected biological theories 
of racial difference in the face of conclusive evidence of the socio-political 
reality of race.  Race, it was finally agreed, had no natural biological or 
genetic meaning.  Rather, it was recognized that the taxonomy of race was 
constructed as a means to impute socio-political meaning to perceived 
human differences in order to morally rationalize unequal human 
treatment.12 
In the modern Postwar World, it was no longer legally, scientifically, 
or politically appropriate to justify the existence of racial inequality in 
terms of biological difference.  Social inequities based on race were finally 
acknowledged as stemming from past and present structural discrimination.  
For a brief period during the Civil Rights Era, our society was thus able to 
enjoy significant advancements in the expansion of constitutional rights, the 
end of de jure public school desegregation, and the pursuit of other 
affirmative measures to address entrenched, structural racism.13  The desire 
by society to distance itself from moral responsibility for past and present 
racial disparities, however, did not completely fade.  Extensive racial 
disparities continued to persist following the Civil Rights period, and an 
                                                                                                     
 12. See UNESCO, FOUR STATEMENTS ON THE RACE QUESTION 33 (1969) (stating that 
race was not “so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth”); see also Angela Harris, 
From Color Line to Color Chart: Racism and Colorism in the New Century, 10 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 52, 68 (2008)  (summarizing the prevailing Post War view as one that 
holds that “race does not exist in the body but rather is the product of socially-produced 
understanding”); see also Howard Winant, Race and Race Theory, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 169, 
172 (2000) (describing race as “a concept that signifies and symbolizes sociopolitical 
conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies”). 
 13. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006)). 
GENETICS, RACE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 345 
ideology of colorblind constitutionalism—that social policy should be blind 
to existing racial disparities—filled the void.14  The doctrine of “equal 
opportunity,” for instance, has been employed to justify persistent racial 
disparities as the product of cultural depravity and a lack of individual 
responsibility.15  In a similar fashion, classic market theory has been often 
relied on to rationalize continuing racial inequalities as the natural products 
of non-biased market processes, rather than the symptoms of past and 
present structural racism.16 
As our society ascends into the 21st Century, we continue the struggle 
to take account of race and racial inequality.17  The moral need to reconcile 
pervasive racial disparities with the comforting perception of racial 
transcendence and absolution has never been stronger.  The courts and 
public continue to rely on time-tested sophisms, such as the doctrine of 
equal opportunity and market theory, to explain why inequalities continue 
to exist in the assumed absence of structural racism.  Yet these dated 
colorblind distancing strategies may no longer be sufficient to assuage the 
                                                                                                     
 14. EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND RACISM AND 
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2003) (“Much as Jim 
Crow served as the glue for defending a brutal and overt system of racial oppression in the 
pre-Civil Rights era, color-blind racism serves today as the ideological armor for a covert 
and institutionalized system in the post-Civil Rights era.”). 
 15. See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1978); 
see also Christian B. Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Liberty and Meritocracy in 
Education: Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 227, 228–29 (2003). As I have previously summarized, the cultural deficit 
interpretation of “equal opportunity” provides as follows: “The story goes like this: the 
paradigm of equal opportunity is a truly objective, neutral, and fair method to allocate 
educational, employment, and political resources to members of society, without regard to 
race, class, gender, or ethnicity.  The ideal of equality assumes the possibility of an objective 
measure of merit under which individuals’ abilities and performances may be evaluated.  
Accordingly, through the creation of a baseline that presupposes the inherent sameness of all 
people and disregards systemic discrimination as a fallacy, any social and economic 
inequality that exists is said to be legitimate because it purportedly reflects the natural results 
of deficient personal choices. In the context of education, a child's inability to capitalize on 
an equal opportunity to achieve can only be understood as personal failure. Using this 
framework to interpret my own experiences, it would appear that the relative educational 
failure of my friends and students was not influenced by their status as low-income racial 
minorities, but rather was the inevitable end result of poor choices and individual 
deficiencies.”  
 16. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, Why Markets Don’t Stop Discrimination, in FREE 
MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 151, 151–67 (1997). 
 17. W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 9 (1903). The words of W.E.B. 
DuBois are as true today, as they were in the past: “The problem of the Twentieth Century is 
the problem of the color line.”   
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cognitive dissonance and moral shame stoked by acknowledging continuing 
inequality. After all, the devices of equal opportunity, colorblind 
constitutionalism, and market deregulation have been in force for 
decades—during which time we have seen racial disparities increase rather 
than decrease.18 
The undiminished desire to interpret the world in post-race and 
colorblind terms has found a fresh, yet familiar, rationalization for 
inequality that sounds in genetic racial difference.  Reminiscent of 
discredited racial biologies of yore, the emerging scientific, social and legal 
trend is to treat race as a scientifically relevant grouping of persons.  The 
modern field of population genetics has been relied on to support spurious 
claims that “race” can be distilled to a meaningful biological essence. A 
scientific analysis of a sample of deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) can 
purportedly empirically determine an individual’s biological race, even 
though it relies on the same antiquated (and discredited) racial taxonomies 
first developed during the 1700s.  As a result, pharmaceutical companies 
have spent millions of dollars to develop and market race-based drugs.19  
Private genetic companies have also popularized DNA testing with the 
misleading claim that they are able to scientifically isolate a person’s racial 
and ethnic ancestry.20   The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) has similarly entered the fray by approving race-based 
biotechnology patents.21  And perhaps most disturbingly, modern genetic 
theories of race have obtained the official imprimatur of law, as state and 
federal courts throughout the United States routinely permit the admission 
of racial DNA probabilistic evidence.22  It is now, for instance, normal for 
courts in criminal cases to admit evidence that there is only a “1 in 41 
                                                                                                     
 18. KOCCHAR, supra note 8, at 4; see also U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 
7, at 1.  
 19. See Nicholas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued…, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/weekinreview/14nick.html (describing a heart-
attack drug which has been developed for and marketed to African-Americans). 
 20. See, e.g., Ancestry DNA Testing: Unlock Your Past, ANCESTRY BY DNA, 
http://www.ancestrybydna.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).  
 21. See Jonathon Kahn, Race-ing Patents/Patenting Race: An Emerging Political 
Geography of Intellectual Property in Biotechnology, 92 IOWA L. REV. 353, 364 (2007). 
 22. See infra Part III (discussing how DNA probabilistic evidence consists of expert 
testimony and documents that provide an estimate of the probability that a party’s genetic 
profile “matches” that of DNA sample found at a crime scene, on a crime victim or in some 
civil setting.  Such genetic probabilistic evidence is “racialized” when the estimate provided 
to the finder of fact relies on racial genetic profiles).   
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million chance” that another “Hispanic-American” or “African-American” 
or “Caucasian” or “Native-American” or “Asian-American” or “Puerto-
Rican” or “Caribbean-American” shares the same genetic profile as a 
criminal defendant.23  The Supreme Court of the United States has so far 
ignored the troubling implications of racial DNA evidence in its cases.24 
The reemergence of a biological understanding of race is not 
surprising, both given the recentness of our history of manipulating science 
to validate racial difference and the increasing cognitive and moral need to 
rationalize continuing racial inequalities as normal and natural in a “post-
race” era.25  This Article links the modern trend to view race in genetic 
terms to the post-race worldview, while framing the doctrinal and 
constitutional argument against the legal acceptance of genetic racial 
theories.  The first section of the Article will chart the historical invention 
of the race concept, while highlighting the critical role that science has 
played in shaping our understanding of race and difference.  The section 
will also examine the Postwar rejection of biological theories of race, while 
further elaborating on the socio-political nature of race. 
Part II of the Article explores the conflicting ways in which our 
Postwar society has interpreted racial inequality. A model of race 
consciousness dominated the manner in which our society viewed existing 
racial disparities during the Civil Rights era, yet was soon displaced by 
colorblind and post-racial interpretative methodologies.  This section 
examines this history, while relying on psychological theory to suggest that 
such post-race distancing moves are motivated by an implicit desire to 
move beyond race and conceal systemic racism. 
Part III of the Article analyzes the modern trend to view race in 
genetic terms, and explores the manner in which the field of population 
genetics has been relied on to normalize scientific racial distinctions.  This 
section also analyzes the judicial acceptance of racial probabilistic 
interpretations of DNA evidence, and sets forth a doctrinal critique of the 
practice under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  In particular, this section 
                                                                                                     
 23. See, e.g., Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Penn, 838 F. Supp. 1054, 1065 (D.V.I. 1993); 
see also infra Part III of this Article. 
 24. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 25. See DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG 
BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 291 (2012) (discussing that the 
notion of biological difference was “the predominant explanation for racial inequality for 
several centuries”).  
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argues for an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence that would 
clearly establish the inadmissibility of such evidence at trial. 
The final section of the Article sets forth a substantive Due Process 
challenge to the legal acceptance of genetic theories of race.  This section 
argues that the substantive Due Process doctrine underlying the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as informed by the Ninth Amendment, is violated 
whenever the State officially embraces genetic views on race.  In particular, 
this section argues that such a practice violates the fundamental 
constitutional right to a shared humanity by placing State imprimatur on 
discredited notions of racial biological difference. 
I.  Science Fictions and the Fantasy of Race  
The fantasy of “race” as a means of assigning social and political value 
to perceived human difference did not develop until fairly recently.  The 
origin of the race concept cannot be traced to neutral scientific discoveries 
of natural biological difference.  Race was never empirically established as 
a scientific property of humanity, in the same way that skin color, hair 
texture, and body shape have biological roots.  Rather, the taxonomy of 
race has historically developed as a tool of social control, and as a means to 
rationalize the unequal treatment of subjugated persons.26 
A.  European Imperialism and Colonization 
Any understanding of race must begin with an appreciation of the 
critical role played by the period of European imperialism and colonialism 
in shaping our ideas of human difference.  The European colonization, 
conquest and exploitation of non-European lands were initially justified on 
the grounds of religious difference and messianic duty.27  Rough folk 
notions of “race” then developed during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
centuries as a measure of religious difference.  Whereas Europeans were 
                                                                                                     
 26. See MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: FROM THE 1960’S TO THE 1990’S (2d ed. 1994) (detailing the theory of race’s social 
construction). 
 27. See Klaus Ernst, Racialism, Racialist Ideology and Colonialism, in SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORIES: RACE AND COLONIALISM 458, 458–59 (1981) (“At the beginning of the capitalist 
colonial expansion, campaigns of looting and conquest against non-Europeans were justified 
by the Cross and by the desire to spread the Christian religion in the true spirit of the Middle 
Ages.”). 
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viewed as achieving a nigh perfect state of Christian humanity, non-
Europeans were viewed as existing in an inferior non-Christian and 
subhuman state of nature.28   The pre-modern linkage of racial and religious 
difference was necessary to legitimate the class exploitation and conquest 
that marked the period of European imperialism.  Early notions of racial 
difference thus developed to “resolve the contradiction between humanistic 
universalism and Christian particularism—by representing non-Christians 
as nonhuman” and therefore subject to conquest and enslavement.29 
B.  The Age of Empiricism 
The pre-modern understanding of human identity and racial inferiority 
was deeply rooted in religious difference during the period of European 
imperialism.  The assumptions of religious and moral inferiority that 
informed the nascent colonial concept of race, however, gave way to 
“scientific” interpretations of racial difference during the Enlightenment 
period.  The development of the modern scientific method during this time, 
with its focus on empiricism and rationality, facilitated the scientific study 
of human difference.  The pre-modern belief in natural human inequality, as 
exemplified by the Aristotelian concept of a “great chain of being,” made it 
“but a small step to apply the same concept of hierarchical ordering within 
the ranks of humankind” during Enlightenment scientific studies of race.30  
As the philosopher David Theo Goldberg recounts, 
Empiricism encouraged the tabulation of perceivable differences 
between peoples and from this it deduced their natural differences.  
Rationalism proposed initial innate distinctions (especially mental ones) 
to explain the perceived behavioural disparities… The emergence of 
independent scientific domains of anthropology and biology defined a 
                                                                                                     
 28. JOE R. FEAGIN & CLAIRECE BOOHER FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS (5th 
ed. 1996) (noting that the imperialist quest for colonization, and the creation of slave 
colonies, were legitimated by folk notions of African inferiority). 
 29. Peter Fenves, What “Progresses” Has Race-Theory Made Since the Times of 
Leibniz and Wolff?, in THE GERMAN INVENTION OF RACE 11, 12–13 (Sara Eigen & Mark J. 
Larrimore eds., 2006); see also PAUL GILLEN & DEVLEENA GHOSH, COLONIALISM & 
MODERNITY 176 (2007) (arguing that race developed as “a legitimation of class exploitation” 
and as a “way of constructing certain populations as laboring classes.”  As such, “a crucial 
object for [European] imperialism was the organization of the social world according to 
these [racial] categorizations, or to force the population into its natural class position”). 
 30. WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF RACIAL RESEARCH 10 (1994). 
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classificatory order of racial groupings – subspecies of Homo sapiens – 
along correlated physical and cultural matrixes.31 
The modern scientific method that emerged during the period of the 
Enlightenment by itself, certainly, is not stained with the irrationality of 
race.  Rather, the modern scientific beliefs in empiricism and reason were 
subjectively applied in an effort to rationalize human inequality in terms of 
purported “racial” difference.32  As such, the early Enlightenment theories 
of race are marked by the assumption of innate human differences in moral, 
mental and physical capabilities.  One of the earliest theories of race was 
proposed by the Swedish biologist Carolus Linnaeus in 1735.  In the classic 
text Systema Natura, Linnaeus strove to scientifically separate the natural 
world into distinct biological categories: the plant kingdom, the animal 
kingdom, and the kingdom of stones.33  Linnaeus proposed that humankind 
be separated into four distinct biological categories, described by 
geographical region: Europeaus, Africanus, Americanus and Asiatic.34  The 
Linnaeus taxonomy, eerily similar to contemporary racial categories, 
assigned moral, intellectual and physical values to racial difference: 
 
Europeaus Skin (white); build (muscular); hair (long, flowing); eyes 
(blue); disposition (gentle and inventive) 
Americanus Skin (reddish); build (erect); hair (black, straight, thick); 
distinct facial features (wide nostrils); disposition 
(stubborn and angered easily)
Asiaticus Skin (sallow; yellow); hair (black); eyes (dark); 
disposition (avaricious and easily distracted) 
Africanus Skin (black); hair (black; frizzled); skin texture (silky); 
distinct facial features (nose flat, lips tumid); disposition 
(relaxed and negligent)
 
                                                                                                     
 31. DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE: PHILOSOPHY AND THE POLITICS OF 
MEANING 28–29 (1993). 
 32. KENAN MALIK, THE MEANING OF RACE: RACE, HISTORY AND CULTURE IN WESTERN 
SOCIETY 40 (1996) (stating that “[e]ighteenth century Europe was the cradle of modern 
racism” because “racism has its foundations in the Enlightenment’s ‘preoccupation with a 
rational universe, nature and aesthetics’”). 
 33. Systema Naturae—an epoch-making book, UPPSALA UNIVERSITET, 
http://www.linnaeus.uu.se/online/animal/1_1.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2014). 
 34. See Tucker, supra note 30, at 9. 
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Other Enlightenment theories of race similarly imbued racial 
difference with moral, mental and physical meaning.  Emmanuel Kant 
proposed a racial taxonomy very similar to Linnaeus, separating humanity 
into four racial categories: “the noble blond (northern Europe); copper red 
(America); black (Senegambia); and olive-yellow (Asian-Indians).”35  Kant 
believed that racial distinctions were biologically based and immutable.36  
Unsurprisingly, Kant’s conception of race justified the unequal treatment 
and slavery of non-white persons on the assumption of white biological 
superiority.  As Kant described in his essay On the Different Human Races: 
(Whites:) contain all natural motive springs in affects and passions, all 
talents, all predispositions to culture and civilization and can obey as 
well as rule.  They are the only ones who constantly progress toward 
perfection… Blacks can become disciplined and cultivated but never 
truly civilized… All races will become exterminated/uprooted 
(Americans and Blacks cannot govern themselves.  They thus serve only 
as slaves) only not the Whites.  The stubbornness of Indians in their 
usages is the reason why they do not melt down with the Whites into a 
single people.  It is not good that they intermix.  Spanish in Mexico.  On 
the race of the Whites, who have brought about all revolutions in the 
world.  Nomads have only brought about violent revolutions, not ones 
that sustain themselves… Our (ancient) history of man reliably proceeds 
only from the white race.37 
                                                                                                     
 35. John H. Zammito, Policing Polygeneticism in Germany, 1775: (Kames,) Kant, and 
Blumenbach, in THE GERMAN INVENTION OF RACE 35, 42 (Sara Eigen & Mark Larrimore 
eds., 1996). 
 36. See IMMANUEL KANT, ESSAY ON RACE (1775) (arguing that each racial group had 
biological traits that were “unalterably sustained by succeeding generations even under 
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 37. Susan M. Shell, Kant’s Conception of a Human Race, in THE GERMAN INVENTION 
OF RACE 55–56 (Sara Eigen & Mark Larrimore eds., 2006).  As the sociologist William H. 
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hundred years.”  TUCKER, supra note 30, at 9.  The German physiologist Johann Freidrich 
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BLUMENBACH 264–70 (Thomas Bendyshe ed. & trans,, 1865).  While this scheme became 
one of the most referenced early racial taxonomies, Blumenbach ironically believed that any 
racial classification scheme would be very arbitrary indeed both in number and definition.”  
Id. at 99.  In fact, Blumenbach believed that differences in complexion and phenotype were 
caused by climate, and argued against theories of racial superiority and inferiority.  Id. at 
196–98. 
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For Kant and other Enlightenment race theorists, the “full personhood” 
of the moral citizen was dependent on race.38  Under this Kantian 
perspective, complete membership in the political community (e.g., 
“personhood”) is only available to those moral beings that were capable of 
both reason and will.39  Non-moral agents that are lacking in either reason 
or will, then, are not entitled to the rights attendant to political 
membership—including social equality and even personal freedom.  Kant 
provided that beings that were not capable of achieving morality in this 
strict sense (reason and will), were valueless “animals whom he [the moral 
person] can master and rule at will.”40  Under this framework, only white 
persons were deemed to possess the moral agency to access the equality 
rights guaranteed by membership in the political community.  The scientific 
racial typologies developed by Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers, 
then, were critical in the dehumanization of persons deemed to be “non-
white.” 
The development of a scientific theory of racial inequality was also 
necessary to reconcile persistent class disparities with the Enlightenment 
belief in universal humanity and the natural rights concept of social 
equality.  Pre-modern social inequality was viewed during this time as 
stemming from unjust feudal and monarchist social structures.  An 
Enlightenment belief in universal natural rights and human equality 
necessarily conflicted with continuing social and class disparities in the 
modern era. The inherent wealth inequality that results from private 
ownership of property had to be morally and politically justified in order to 
placate the call for universal rights made by the non-propertied lower 
economic classes.  Adam Smith and other classic economic theorists were 
thus prompted to argue that limits and exceptions to “universal equality” 
were necessary to protect the “natural rights” of the propertied, wealthy 
classes.41 
                                                                                                     
 38. See CHARLES MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 111 (1997) (“It is no accident, then, 
that the . . . practical struggles of nonwhites have so often centered on race, the marker of 
personhood . . . .”). 
 39. See FREDERICK P. VAN DE PITTE, KANT AS PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGIST 49–
57 (1971) (discussing the role of one’s will and practical disposition in social order). 
 40. IMMANUEL KANT, ANTHROPOLOGY FROM A PRAGMATIC POINT OF VIEW 9 (Hans H. 
Rudnick ed., Victor Lyle Dowdell trans., Southern Illinois University Press 1978) (1798). 
 41. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 320 (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago Press 2008) (1789) (“Civil 
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Early theories of race were used during this time to rationalize class 
distinctions in a post-feudal modern society: 
It has already been established that every social order is founded upon 
three original classes, each of which represents a racial variety: the 
nobility, a more or less accurate reflection of the conquering race; the 
bourgeoisie composed of mixed stock coming close to the chief race; 
and the common people who live in servitude or at least in a very 
depressed position.  These last belong to a lower race which came about 
in the south through miscegenation with the negroes and in the north 
with Finns.42 
The move towards viewing race in terms of immutable biological 
difference was thus also a move towards naturalizing social inequality in a 
capitalist modern world. 
C.  Chattel Slavery, Science and Racial Power 
The scientific view of race gained prominence during the period of 
chattel slavery in the United States.  Slavery further exacerbated the tension 
between the seemingly inconsistent Enlightenment principles of social 
equality and natural property rights.  After all, the individual right to 
freedom and social equality clearly conflicted with the claimed natural right 
to own human property.  Three key rationales were popularized to reconcile 
this tension in liberal rights theory: economic necessity, religious 
difference, and biological racial difference. 
Early Colonial law initially made no distinction between African and 
European indentured servants.43  The bondage of both African and 
European indentured servants during this time was viewed as temporary, as 
such servants were allowed to pay off their “debt” over time and obtain 
freedom.44  African and European indentured servants also possessed a 
number of important legal rights, including the right to own property and 
enter into contracts.45  As such, indentured servitude was justified primarily 
on grounds of economic necessity.  While such bondage imposed a 
                                                                                                     
 42. COUNT ARTHUR DE GOBINEAU, ESSAYS ON THE INEQUALITY OF RACES 120 (1915). 
 43. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 65 
(Alfred A. Knopf 8th ed. 2000) (1947) (describing the introduction of Africans into the labor 
force as “simply more indentured servants”). 
 44. See id. at 39 (noting that the first indentured servants were poor whites). 
 45. See id. (mentioning the right of indentured servants to sue their masters). 
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restriction on the servant’s freedom, it was temporary and regarded as a 
“necessary evil” to support economic progress in the burgeoning republic. 
The economic rationale became less normatively coherent as the 
indentured servitude of Africans was transformed into a system of chattel 
slavery.46  A strictly economic rationale was simply insufficient to mediate 
the tension between a system of perpetual human slavery and the principle 
of universal human equality recognized in the Declaration of Independence.  
One enduring method to resolve the long-standing conflict between social 
equality and property rights, as discussed infra, has been to emphasize 
human difference.  As such, the unequal treatment of African slaves came 
to be justified on the grounds of religious difference.  Africans were soon 
viewed as non-Christian heathens and less than “human,” and thus not 
morally entitled to social equality.  Religious difference thus became an 
important basis upon which to resolve the tension between the religious and 
legal tenets of equality and the reality of human enslavement.  It is 
important to note that during this period, moral and religious inferiority was 
distinguished from natural or biological inferiority.  As such, Africans that 
converted to Christianity were afforded legal protections not available to 
non-Christian slaves.47  Chattel slavery was thus promoted as means of 
facilitating the Christian conversion of African slaves.48 
The rationalization of chattel slavery under the guise of religious 
difference, however, became unsustainable as the country’s reliance on the 
“peculiar institution” increased.  The conversion of scores of African slaves 
to Christianity threatened the stability of the chattel slavery system.  The 
law responded by eliminating the religious exemptions from perpetual 
                                                                                                     
 46. See id. (“England came to realize that white servants were 
unsatisfactory . . . [e]ven with all the means used to recruit [indentured servants], the supply 
was still insufficient because the tobacco, rice and indigo plantations had an almost 
insatiable appetite for laborers.”). 
 47. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 
10–11 (1986) (discussing two cases: In re Sir Henry Maneringe where a black person named 
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 48. See THOMAS F. GOSSETT, RACE: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA IN AMERICA 31 (1997) 
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century, a principal justification offered for it was that it was a means of converting the 
heathen.”). 
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bondage, and affirming that African slaves were to be viewed as a form of 
fee simple property.49 
Once the economic and religious difference justifications for slavery 
proved lacking, biological race theory filled the void in mitigating the 
tension between the democratic principle of social equality and the 
expansion of chattel slavery.  Science was relied upon to provide 
“objective” and “empirical” validation of the biological inferiority of non-
white persons in order to classify slaves as less than human, and thus not 
entitled to social equality.50  Race was viewed as an immutable biological 
fact, and slavery as “an expression of the harmony between natural law and 
social organization,” as a means to respond to the equality dilemma.51  
American courts embraced the biological theories of racial inferiority 
of the time to justify the denial of constitutional rights to African-
Americans.52  One of the starkest examples of scientific racial views 
informing constitutional interpretation occurred in the despicable Dred 
Scott decision.53  The United States Supreme Court was tasked with 
resolving whether an African slave had become free by virtue of living in a 
                                                                                                     
 49. For instance, the Virginia legislature passed a statute in 1662 declaring that all 
children born in the colony would acquire the same legal status as their mother, regardless of 
whether the children were baptized as Christians. See FINKELMAN, supra note 47, at 16 
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condition of the mother”), available at http://vagenweb.org/hening (last updated July 19, 
2009).  The Virginia legislature also passed an act in 1667 providing that while African 
“servants” could be baptized as Christians, that such “baptism of slaves doth not exempt 
them from bondage.”  Id.  By 1705, Virginia formally decreed that Africans no longer 
occupied the class of indentured servants, but instead were to be considered a form of fee 
simple property.  William Walter Hening, An act declaring the Negro, Mulatto, and Indian 
slaves within this dominion, to be real estate, HENING’S STATUTES AT LARGE, 
http://vagenweb.org/hening/vol03-20.htm (last updated July 19, 2009); see also, A. LEON 
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period). 
 50. See Joel M. Sipress, Relearning Race: Teaching Race as a Cultural Construction, 
30 HIST. TCHR. 175, 175–85 (1997) (discussing the transition from teaching that disparities 
between races exist as a biological problem to a social construction). 
 51. See TUCKER, supra note 30, at 12–25 (discussing the scientific law used to 
rationalize slavery); see also Sipress, supra note 50, at 175–85 (discussing the biological 
relationship). 
 52. See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1856) [hereinafter Dred Scott] 
(holding that persons of African descent were not intended to be considered citizens under 
the Constitution). 
 53. See id. (holding that persons of African descent were not intended to be considered 
citizens under the Constitution). 
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free state and U.S. territory where slavery was prohibited under the 
Missouri Compromise.54  The Court held that African-Americans—whether 
free or enslaved—had no legal rights under the U.S. Constitution, and thus 
could not sue as “citizens” in courts of law.  The Court justified its holding 
on the assumed biological inferiority of African-Americans: 
[African-Americans] were considered as subordinate and inferior class 
of beings, who . . . had no rights or privileges . . . . [African-Americans] 
had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an 
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, 
either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro 
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.  He was 
bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and 
traffic, whenever a profit could be made by it.55 
D.  Social Darwinism and Race Theory 
The end of de jure slavery in the United States did not temper the sway 
of biological theories of race.  The continuing social and legal oppression of 
African-Americans during the Reconstruction and Jim Crow eras, after all, 
would only be seen as morally justifiable to many white Americans if black 
inferiority remained a matter of immutable biological fact.  Biological 
theories of race thus continued to play a vital role in carving out the 
“‘somatic demarcations’ between those persons fit/unfit for full moral 
personhood and full membership in the polity.”56 
The emergence of Darwinian evolutionary theory in the biological 
sciences played a crucial role in the continued scientific reification of innate 
racial difference during this period.  Charles Darwin theorized that 
biological variation in the natural world resulted from gradual evolution 
within species pursuant to a process of natural selection.57 Darwin 
                                                                                                     
 54. See id. at 403 (“Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported to this country, and 
sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought into the 
existence by the Constitution . . . and become entitled to all the rights and privileges, and 
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453 (1999) (book review). 
 57. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES (1959) (discussing his 
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recognized the possibility that his work could be wrongly utilized to bolster 
claims of biological racial inferiority, and thus took pains to clarify that all 
races of humans belonged to the same species: 
Although the existing races of man differ in many respects as in color, 
hair, shape of skull, proportions of the body, etc., yet if their whole 
structure be taken into consideration they are found to resemble each 
other closely in a multitude of points.  Many of these are so unimportant 
or of so singular a nature that it is extremely improbable that they should 
have been independently acquired by aboriginally distinct species or 
races.58 
The possibility of rationalizing unequal social treatment in terms of 
evolutionary inferiority, however, proved too alluring for scores of 
scientists.  In particular, the social Darwinism movement sought to apply 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory to contemporary social problems in order to 
rationalize existing racial and class inequality.59  Social Darwinists believed 
that unfettered market competition was necessary in order to further human 
evolutionary progress.60  Accordingly, the social Darwinist movement 
opposed any and all attempts to eliminate social inequality, including 
government programs to aid the poor, minimum wage legislation, charitable 
donations, and free public education.61  Social Darwinists also misapplied 
evolutionary theory to claim that the different “races” represented different 
positions on the human evolutionary ladder.62  Building off past scientific 
assumptions of non-white racial inferiority, social Darwinists argued that 
the white race had achieved the highest level of evolution, while non-white 
races remained hopelessly stuck in a lower stage of natural evolution.63  The 
whole of human civilization and social progress, under this view, was 
                                                                                                     
 58. CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX 237 
(1902) (1871), available at http://darwin-online.org.uk/. 
 59. See TUCKER, supra note 30, at 26–28 (describing the application of social 
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attributed to “‘the struggle of race with race and the survival of the 
physically and mentally fitter [white] race.’”64 
The infamous Lochner v. New York65 Supreme Court decision was 
likely influenced by the views of social Darwinists. In Lochner, the Court 
struck down a New York state labor regulation that limited the number of 
hours that bakers could be forced to work by their employers.66  The Court 
held that the statute impinged on the employers’ freedom to contract for 
labor, and therefore violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.67  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dissented from the majority 
holding, decrying that the majority’s reasoning was inappropriately based 
“upon an economic theory” of laissez faire that was informed by the “Social 
Statics [sic]” of the preeminent social Darwinist leader – Herbert Spencer.68 
The social Darwinist perspective posited that the continued legal and 
social oppression of “inferior races” was the only rational method to 
improve society.69 Under this view, the resolution of the “race problem,” 
and the advancement of society as a whole, depended on the elimination of 
biologically inferior races from the genetic pool: 
If [blacks] were the highest form of human life, we might be 
concerned… [But] to the clear, cold eye of science, the plight of these 
backward peoples appears practically hopeless.  They have neither part 
nor parcel in the future history of man.70 
Many scientists during this period were emboldened by the burgeoning 
social Darwinism field to develop scientific methods in order to hasten the 
human evolutionary process.  Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin, 
                                                                                                     
 64. TUCKER, supra note 30, at 29 (quoting KARL PEARSON, NATIONAL LIFE FROM THE 
STANDPOINT OF SCIENCE 21 (1905)). 
 65. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905) (holding that a New York 
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and employees protected by the Constitution). 
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was one of the first scientists to found the field of eugenics.  Galton and 
other eugenicists believed that science could be utilized to create a perfect 
“human race,” by promoting the transmission of superior genes and 
inhibiting the transmission of inferior genes.71  Unsurprisingly, for Galton 
and most other social Darwinists, the goal of eugenics during this time 
meant the scientific validation of folk assumptions of white superiority and 
black inferiority. 
A principal goal of eugenicists, therefore, was to develop scientific 
measures by which to evaluate genetic potential.  Some of the first eugenic 
tests sought to determine intellectual ability and human “merit.”  Galton 
was able to develop one of the first standardized IQ tests, finding that 
African-Americans scored two grades lower than whites.  Galton 
interpreted these early findings as indicating that the majority of African-
Americans were “half-witted” and thus genetically inferior to white 
persons.72 
Following Galton’s “scientific” findings of black intellectual 
inferiority, the psychology field collaborated with eugenicists to develop 
additional mental tests in order to scientifically determine human worth.  
The intelligence test soon became the principal scientific method in 
psychology, despite the fact that these purportedly neutral tests were 
racially biased: 
Even before data from the new mental tests had been gathered, many 
social scientists had already made up their mind about the intelligence of 
blacks and immigrants . . . Indeed, had the data conflicted with already 
received opinion, the new instruments would probably have been 
invalidated as measures of intelligence and discarded; some earlier tests 
of ability had already suffered such a fate when they failed to yield the 
expected racial ordering.73  
E.  Applied Racial Eugenics and the Holocaust 
The biased assumptions and disturbing policies of eugenicists were 
soon integrated into society by law.  Restrictive immigration laws,74 Jim 
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Crow policies, anti-miscegenation laws, and forced sterilization policies75 
were all justified by the eugenicist claim that African-Americans and non-
white immigrants possessed inferior genetic material.  The fervor over 
applied eugenics as a scientific method to improve the “racial health” of 
society eventually extended beyond American scientists and politicians, as 
a number of Northern European countries began advocating racial eugenic 
reforms.  For instance, in 1931 the Swedish Professor Herman Lundborg 
advocated for restrictive racial eugenic measures such as confinement and 
sterilization of “the inherently degenerate.”76  Professor Lundborg 
cautioned that failed to adopt a program of “race hygiene” would result in 
“the [superior white] race” facing “dissolution and extinction.”77  
Accordingly, Professor Lundborg urged that European societies “must at 
any price keep the quality of the [white] race at a high level” in order to 
avoid social disintegration.78 
German scientists and politicians also became intrigued by the promise 
of applied racial eugenics to preserve hierarchical structures of power.  
Following the First World War, German politicians attributed the nation’s 
dire economic distress to racial biological degeneration and social welfare 
programs for the genetically inferior.79  The Weimar government soon 
established “race hygiene” – Rassenhygiene -  centers around the country in 
order to preserve the racial health of Germany.  German eugenicists soon 
proposed sterilization programs and anti-miscegenation policies that were 
modeled after similar measures adopted in the United States.80  Many 
German eugenicists – including Hans F.K. Gunther, who would later be 
seen as one of the key founders of Nazi racial ideology - believed that the 
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 75. See TUCKER, supra note 30, at 61 (noting that by conservative estimates, over 
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at prohibiting genetic transmission from “socially inadequate” persons). 
 76. See Herman Lundborg, Race Biological Perspectives, 9 SOC. FORCES 397, 400 
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restrictive immigration, sterilization and anti-miscegenation programs 
adopted in the United States were “only the first step… to still more 
definite laws dealing with race and eugenics.”81 
The nation regrettably adopted more severe eugenics measures once 
the Nazi political party of Adolf Hitler came into power in 1933.82  
Compulsory sterilization laws were strictly enforced, and the anti-
miscegenation Nuremberg Laws restricted intermarriage between Jews and 
Aryans.83  Fearing that these measures were not advancing the racial health 
of Germany in a timely manner, the Nazi government thereafter created 
euthanasia programs to murder those persons deemed genetically inferior.84  
At first directed only towards the mentally and physically handicapped, the 
euthanasia programs soon were applied to all non-white persons, including 
Jews, Slavs and the Roma.85  The “Final Solution” euthanasia program 
adopted by Nazi Germany sought to eliminate the entire Jewish population 
of 9 million persons, who were deemed to be a non-white, genetically 
inferior race that impeded the racial purity of the German political 
community.  Over six million persons were coldly murdered during the 
Holocaust, including two-thirds of the Jewish population of Europe.86  
Millions of other persons perished in forced labor camps created by the 
Nazi government, and through other euthanasia programs.87 
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F.  The Post-War Sociology of Race 
As the preceding section briefly illustrates, the conception of race as a 
biologically meaningful category has had terribly dire consequences for 
persons deemed “non-white” in our world’s history.  Race developed as a 
political means to rationalize the unequal legal and social treatment of 
individuals and groups.  Science historically has played a vital role in 
obscuring the contrived roots of the race concept while validating the rape, 
enslavement, unequal legal treatment, discrimination, and murder of 
millions upon millions of people deemed falling outside of the “white” 
racial construct. 
The Postwar World finally realized its error in succumbing to the 
allure of invented biological notions of racial difference in the aftermath of 
the unspeakable Nazi atrocities.  The newly-formed United Nations created 
a special organization – the Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (“UNESCO”) – in part to articulate an authoritative statement 
on the nature of race.  Relying on the contributions of scores of prominent 
anthropologists, sociologists, historians, and biologists, the UNESCO 
committee conclusively determined that “race” had no meaningful 
biological meaning.  In particular, the UNESCO committee concluded that 
“’race’ [was] not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth” and 
construction.88 
The scientific, political, legal and academic recognition of race as a 
social construction has been nearly universal.  Esteemed social scientists 
have long declared that “race isn’t very important biologically”89 and that it 
would “be better if the term ‘race’ were altogether abandoned.”90  Rather, 
race is recognized as an invented “concept that signifies and symbolizes 
sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human 
bodies.”91 As a political construction, racial meaning is derived not from 
genetic differentiation but from socio-legal attitudes.  Such an account 
restores historical accuracy to our understanding of the race concept, as race 
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is viewed as an “ideology of inequality devised to rationalize European 
attitudes and treatment of the conquered and enslaved peoples” in order to 
perpetuate social inequality and existing structures of power.92 
The biological account of race has been shown to be inaccurate at best, 
and a vehicle for legitimating racial discrimination and inequality at 
worst.93  During the Enlightenment age, the era of European colonialism, 
and the periods of American chattel slavery and Jim Crow discrimination, 
biological conceptions of race were employed in order to reconcile the 
obvious tension caused by belief in democratic constitutional equality in the 
face of continued social and class inequality.  Race is simply meaningless 
as a biological matter.  As the renowned sociologist Howard Winant 
explains: 
Although the concept of race appeals to biologically based human 
characteristics (phenotypes), selection of these particular human features 
for purposes of racial signification is always and necessarily a social and 
historical process.  There is no biological basis for distinguishing human 
groups along the lines of race, and the sociohistorical categories 
employed to differentiate among these groups reveal themselves, upon 
serious examination, to be imprecise if not completely arbitrary.94 
Other commentators have noted that “responsible scientists have long 
discredited any biological or genetic definition of racial groups.”95  Rather, 
“historians have increasingly recognized that the so-called races of mankind 
are the fortuitous and arbitrary inventions of European and American 
history, the by-products, primarily, of Europe’s religious, economic and 
imperial expansion across the seas of the earth.”96 
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The law, in contrast to the current judicial trend to define race in 
genetic terms, had also affirmed the social constructivist underpinnings of 
race in much of its Postwar racial discrimination jurisprudence.97 The 
United States Supreme Court adopted the findings of modern Postwar 
science that “racial classifications [are] arbitrary” in reaching its conclusion 
in a Title VII race discrimination action that race is “for the most part 
sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature.”98  In a similar fashion, the 
Ninth Circuit also stridently affirmed the law’s recognition of the social 
construction of race in its past jurisprudence: 
Race got its standing in the nineteenth century by pseudo-science. In the 
name of that science the “Anglo-Saxon race” was glorified, and 
immigration to America diluting “the Anglo-Saxon heritage” was 
viewed with alarm. In the name of that science the “yellow peril” of 
immigration from Asia was decried . . . . In the name of that science, 
persons were assigned to biological groupings that were perceived as 
superior or as degenerate. Now it is scientifically accepted that races 
“are not, and never were, groups clearly defined biologically.”99 
Recognition of the political and sociological nature of race had thus 
become one of the bedrock truisms of the Postwar era.  The change in how 
race was perceived during this time eventually shifted social and legal 
perceptions on the State’s role in addressing persistent racial inequality. 
II.  On Colorblindness, Postracialism and the Politics of Difference 
The Postwar World largely embraced the scientific conclusion that 
race was a socio-political creation.  It was therefore no longer legally, 
scientifically, or politically defensible to rationalize the continued existence 
of race-based inequities in terms of biological different.  As racial 
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inequality could no longer be formally justified on the grounds of genetic 
inferiority, the United States was forced to recognize structurally-embedded 
systems of racial discrimination as the root of racial inequalities.  For a 
brief period during the Civil rights era, America was thus able to enjoy 
significant advancements in the expansion of constitutional rights, the end 
of de jure segregation, and the pursuit of other affirmative measures to 
address entrenched, structural racism. 
A.  The Civil Rights Era 
In the immediate wake of World War II, the United States struggled 
with resolving the conflict between the American democratic ideal of 
equality and the reality of domestic racial oppression.  The historian Peter 
B. Levy concisely summarizes the critical role that the end of World War II 
played in changing America’s attitudes toward race: 
The impact of World War II on the nation’s ideology cannot be 
understated.  The war put white supremacy on the defensive through 
propaganda put forth by the United States in opposition to the Nazi 
regime and by means of official proclamations, such as the Atlantic 
Charter and the founding documents of the United Nations, which 
reaffirmed America’s belief in the principles expressed in the 
Declaration of Independence.  Despite segregation in the armed forces 
and racial violence at home, the overall message of the war effort was 
that proponents of racial supremacy were wrong and that America 
would prosper because of its faith in equality and freedom for all.  The 
Holocaust, which revealed to the world the atrocities that could be 
committed by a people driven by the ideology of racial supremacy, 
strengthened the American public’s belief in the ideal of equality for all 
and marginalized open advocates of white supremacy.100 
The Civil Rights Movement capitalized on the hypocrisy of America 
race relations, in part by framing its political message in terms of liberal 
equality and justice.101  Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw observes 
that “[t]he use of rights rhetoric during the civil rights movement created 
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[an ideological] crisis by presenting and manipulating dominant ideology in 
a new and transformative way.”102  Organized by courageous and 
inspirational leaders, the movement focused public attention on the moral 
contradiction between the “American creed” of democratic equality and 
state-sanctioned racism.103  The movement’s success in unmasking the 
pervasiveness of entrenched racial inequality created enormous political 
and moral pressures on the executive, legislative and judiciary branches for 
social change.104 
As public awareness of race discrimination increased as a result of the 
Civil Rights Movement, so did international scrutiny of American race 
relations.105  Spurred by such international criticism, President Harry 
Truman was forced to acknowledge that the “United States was not so 
strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we 
can ignore what the world thinks of our [racial] record.”106  As such, 
President Truman established the President’s Committee on Civil Rights in 
1946 (the “Committee”).107  The Committee was tasked with examining the 
state of civil rights in America following the war, and proposing 
recommendations to “safeguard the civil rights of the people.”108  In a 
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report entitled To Secure These Rights, the Committee recommended direct 
government action to combat racial discrimination for three reasons: “a 
moral reason (race discrimination was wrong), an economic reason (racism 
harmed the US economy), and an international reason (racism damaged 
foreign relations).”109  The report was significant in that it was one of the 
first Postwar attempts to articulate a right to “equal opportunity,” whereby 
each citizen is entitled to “enjoy the benefits of society… with complete 
disregard to race, color, creed and national origin.”110  In so doing, the 
Committee attempted to reconcile the disconnect between the American 
“heritage of freedom and equality” and the “reality” of widespread race 
discrimination and inequality.111  While the meaning of “equal opportunity” 
eventually would be perverted by future jurisprudence to invalidate State 
attempts to address racial inequality,112 at the time this concept was at the 
vanguard of state efforts to affirmatively address race discrimination. 
The gradual social recognition of the persistence of racism and the 
pervasiveness of race-based social inequalities enabled significant progress 
during the Civil Rights era.113  Spurred by the transformative Civil Rights 
Movement, as well as the perceived political need to repair the American 
record on race relations during the Cold War,114 the United States achieved 
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an end to de jure racial segregation,115 enacted critical civil rights 
legislation,116 and adopted affirmative measures to address entrenched 
racial inequality in employment and education.117 
B.  The Move Beyond Race: Non-Biological Distancing 
The laws enacted during the civil rights period provided for the formal 
protection of equal employment, voting and educational opportunities for 
all Americans.118  While the de jure recognition of such civil rights was 
undoubtedly critical to racial progress, the achievements of the Civil Rights 
era failed to completely undermine historical legacies of white privilege and 
racial inequality.119   In that the laws passed during this period did little to 
upset the unequal distribution of property, wealth and other social resources 
that existed along racial lines, the gains of the civil rights era were 
conservative and fleeting.  The eradication of formal racial discrimination 
simply “failed to address the synergy between law and society that helped 
                                                                                                     
“As the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States heated up, the Soviets 
pointed to the ‘U.S. policy’ of discriminating against minorities and used virtually every 
incident of violence toward or mistreatment of African Americans as a propaganda weapon 
to embarrass the United States and to win favor with the numerous developing, newly 
independent nations, many of which were nonwhite.” 
 115. See Exec. Order No. 9,981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4,313 (1948) (creating a committee to 
examine the existing rules, procedures, and practices of the armed forces to suggest 
alterations to end racial segregation in the military); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 
495 (1954) (ending de jure racial segregation in public education); but see Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (“Brown II”) (allowing desegregation to take place “with 
all deliberate speed”). 
 116. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2006)); and Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 
79 Stat. 437 (1965) (prohibiting discrimination or segregation in places of public 
accommodation). 
 117. See Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1,977 (1961) (requiring government 
contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that 
employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or 
national origin”).  Additionally, the Executive Order established the President’s Committee 
on Equal Employment Opportunity, which would later become the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission in the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
 118. See Perea, supra note 104, at 51 (noting that a principal aim of the civil rights 
movement was to “eliminate the continuing vestiges of one of the United States’ most 
profound and recognized moral sins: federal and state sponsored slavery”). 
 119. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF 
RACISM 3–4 (1992) (discussing the continuing effects of racial inequality and the statistical 
evidence to support such a finding). 
GENETICS, RACE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 369 
accumulate and compound centuries of white power and privilege using 
neutral means.”120 
Racial disparities in education, employment, income, wealth, health 
outcomes, incarceration and a slew of other social metrics continued to 
exist following the civil rights era.121  Such disparities continued to exist 
due to a failure to interrogate the background conditions of racial inequality 
and privilege, as well as the persistence of systemic racial discrimination.122  
Rather than acknowledge a continuing moral and legal responsibility for 
persistent racial disparities, society and its institutions strove to contrive 
alternative race-neutral explanations for inequality.  America, simply put, 
was unwilling to interrogate its underlying racial privilege. 
The government thereafter ushered in a period of “benign neglect” on 
race matters, choosing to focus on race-neutral approaches to racial 
inequality.  New York Congressman Daniel Patrick Moynihan, for instance, 
pleaded that white Americans needed a psychological respite from racial 
matters following the Civil Rights era.  In an internal memo sent to 
President Nixon, Moynihan advised that “the time may have come when the 
issue of race could benefit from a period of ‘benign neglect’” and that “the 
subject” of race “has been too much talked about.”123  An earlier report 
published by Moynihan in 1965 on the status of “the Negro Family” 
similarly argued that government policy should “deemphasize the issue of 
racism and discrimination” and address persistent racial inequality through 
race-neutral policies such as “equal opportunity” and “colorblind 
universalism.”124  Rather than continue “social policies aimed at addressing 
racism” that were proven effective during the Civil Rights era, the 
Moynihan Report recommended that the government adopt unproven race-
neutral policies to resolve the matter of racial inequality.  That such 
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recommendations were motivated by a desire to assuage the moral 
conscious of white American voters seems beyond reasonable dispute. 125 
Race-neutral social ideology in the post-Civil Rights world tends to 
rationalize race-based inequality in four overlapping ways, by employing 
(1) cultural explanations for inequality, (2) the rhetoric of liberal concepts 
of the free market, individualism and equal opportunity, (3) the tools of 
colorblind constitutionalism and (4) the politics of post-racialism.  
Immediately following the end of the Civil Rights Movement, the 
underlying cause of persistent racial disparities was linked to black cultural 
depravity under a burgeoning colorblind mentality.  In other words, the 
race-neutral colorblind perspective advanced by Moynihan and others 
sought to shift the moral responsibility of racial inequality from the 
government and white America to African-Americans and other persons of 
color.  The move to view racial disparities as caused by black and non-
white cultural deficiencies soon found its voice in sociological “culture of 
poverty” theories.  Sociologist William Julius Wilson concluded in his book 
The Declining Significance of Race that government policy on eliminating 
racial disparities should not be race-regarding or focus on discrimination.126  
Echoing the perverse story of black depravity cultivated during the slavery 
era, Wilson argued that the government should continue race-neutral 
policies to address social inequality.  While “culture of poverty” models 
were heavily criticized and discredited by many in years past, they have 
experienced a popular resurgence in the academic literature.127  The new 
found popularity of “culture of poverty” arguments is likely traceable to the 
broader socio-cognitive impulse to obscure the structural roots of racial and 
class inequality.128 
Emphasizing non-white, and in particular black, cultural inferiority has 
enabled considerable political gain amongst white voters by both 
conservative and liberal politicians.  Ronald Reagan, for instance, 
infamously wielded the racist imagery of the “black welfare queen” in 
campaigning for the presidency.129  President Bill Clinton similarly utilized 
                                                                                                     
 125. See generally Darren Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917 
(2009). 
 126. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE (1980). 
 127. “Culture of poverty” sociological theories have experienced a resurgence in recent 
years.  See David J. Harding, Michele Lamont & Mario Luis Small, Reconsidering Culture 
and Poverty, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.  6, 6–7 (2010). 
 128. See infra Part III. 
 129. See Andre Pond Cummings, Racial Coding and the Financial Market Crisis, 2011 
 
GENETICS, RACE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 371 
the racially coded language of “undeserving welfare queens” to rationalize 
severe cuts to social welfare spending.130  And even President Barack 
Obama has deployed racial narratives of black cultural depravity for 
political gain.131 
The move to view race-based disparities as the natural offshoot of 
cultural deficiencies found its ideological packing in the liberal notion of 
equal opportunity.  During the Civil Rights Movement, the concept of equal 
opportunity developed as an attempt to affirmatively respond to the 
disconnect between the American “heritage of freedom and equality” and 
the “reality” of pervasive racism and discrimination.132  Part and parcel of 
the original vision of equal opportunity, then, was recognition that 
affirmative state measures were necessary to remedy racial inequality.133  
As Justice Harry Blackmon famously noted, a prevailing view during the 
Civil Rights Movement was that “[in] order to get beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race.  There is no other way.  And in order to treat 
some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”134  This conception 
of equal opportunity, borne out of the social progress achieved during the 
Civil Rights Movement, was based on an understanding that racial 
inequality was caused by continuing racial discrimination and a legacy of 
racial oppression.  And what if American society moved to embrace race-
neutral explanations for racial inequality?  What if society disingenuously 
ignored the persistence of racism, and rather viewed racial disparities as 
being caused by cultural factors?  What role would the concept of “equal 
opportunity” play in this colorblind re-envisioning of race? 
Unfortunately, the notion of “equal opportunity” became a normative 
centerpiece of the racial project to view inequality in terms of cultural 
deficiency and market outcomes.  Detached from its intellectual moorings, 
the notion of equal opportunity has been perverted under “culture of 
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poverty” theories to justify government and social inaction on issues of 
racial inequality.  As I have summarized previously, the colorblind 
interpretation of equal opportunity provides: 
[that] the paradigm of equal opportunity is a truly objective, neutral and 
fair method to allocate educational, employment, and political resources 
to members of society, without regard to race, class, gender or ethnicity.  
The ideal of equality assumes the possibility of an objective measure of 
merit under which individuals’ abilities and performances may be 
evaluated.  Accordingly, through the creation of a baseline that 
presupposes the inherent sameness of all people and disregards systemic 
discrimination as a fallacy, any social and economic inequality that 
exists is said to be legitimate because it purportedly reflects the natural 
results of deficient personal choices.135 
In this way, the colorblind reinterpretation of the “equal opportunity” 
concept became critical to race-neutral attempts by the government and the 
courts to resolve the tension between American liberal equality and 
persistent racial inequality. 
The artifice of “equal opportunity” has similarly been utilized by the 
Supreme Court to rationalize its adoption of “colorblind 
constitutionalism.”136  From its early iteration in anti-affirmative-action 
cases such as City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.137 and Metro 
Broadcasting v. FCC138 to its modern reliance in school integration cases 
such as Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 
No. 1139 and Fisher v. Texas,140 the concept of colorblindness has been 
employed by the Court to dismantle and prohibit race-regarding social 
policy.  Implicit in the colorblind construct is an assumption that pervasive 
racial discrimination is a social anomaly, such that state measures, which 
directly respond to racial inequality, are viewed as constitutionally suspect.  
Explicit in colorblind jurisprudence is an ironic interpretation of civil rights 
laws as requiring no state consideration of race in policymaking so as to 
protect the liberties of individual white “victims.”141 
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The modern construct of post-racialism142 may be viewed as the 
“liberal embrace of colorblindness.”143  As Professor Sumi Cho has 
succinctly described: 
[P]ost-racialism . . . is a twenty-first-century ideology that reflects a 
belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the 
state need not engage in race-based decision-making or adopt race-based 
remedies, and that civil society should eschew race as a central 
organizing principle of social action.144   
Post-racialism, then, enables a “retreat from race” as an explanation 
for racial inequality while “insulat[ing] white normativity from 
criticism.”145  Under this burgeoning worldview, race-regarding remedies 
and even explicit discussion of racial inequality are seen as unnecessary and 
unfounded in an era that has transcended racism.146 
C.  On Masking Racism: Cognitive Dissonance and the Psychology of 
Moral Absolution 
Our society has long struggled to reconcile its moral belief in equality 
with the seeming intransigence of racial inequality.147  The socio-legal 
success of a given race-neutral distancing strategy thus depends in large 
part on how well it rationalizes the continued existence of racial inequality 
in an ostensibly equal society.  The process of post-race rationalization 
involves a distinct psychological dimension, characterized by the 
normalization of racial privilege (and thus racial inequality) and the 
redemption of whiteness. 
Race-neutral distancing moves, such as post-racialism and 
colorblindness, are motivated by a psychological desire to avoid the 
cognitive dissonance that comes with acknowledging privilege.  As I have 
stated in other contexts: 
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Confronting privilege means acknowledging that benefits and 
advantages received were not necessarily the result of merit and hard 
work, while exposing the deeply held values that have supported 
privilege.  [T]he potential psychic damage to privilege holds forces most 
to ignore and suppress alternative explanations for their status that 
depart from the assumption of naturalness and neutrality.148 
Psychological findings confirm that the expression of colorblind and 
post-race attitudes function to normalize racial privilege while reducing the 
potential for cognitive dissonance.  Psychological theory holds that 
cognitive dissonance “describes the state of psychological discomfort that 
arises” when an individual possess conflicting conceptions of the self.149  
Applied to the racial privilege context, cognitive dissonance theory 
provides that holders of privilege will employ “dissonance reduction 
mechanisms”150—such as colorblindness—in an effort to preserve a view of 
themselves as non-biased and free from privilege.151  The expression of 
post-race and colorblind attitudes, then, exemplifies the “tendency to 
sidestep the mention of race”152 and normalize the racial status quo. 
System Justification Theory (“SJT”) has further empirically concluded 
that “people are motivated to accept and perpetuate features of existing 
social arrangements, even if those features were arrived at accidentally, 
arbitrarily, or unjustly.”153  The cognitive tendency to rationalize the status 
quo represents a coping mechanism for persons confronted with privilege or 
systemic inequality by “reducing anxiety and uncertainty.”154  Therefore, 
holders of privilege have a strong psychological motivation to express 
                                                                                                     
 148. Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System 
Justification, and the Predictable Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 148 
(2011). 
 149. See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957). 
 150. See Paul M. Collins, Jr., Cognitive Dissonance on the U.S. Supreme Court, 64 
POL. RES. Q. 362, 362 (June 2011). 
 151. See Evan P. Apfelbaum et al., Racial Colorblindness: Emergence, Practice and 
Implications, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 205, 206 (June 2012). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justification Theory and Research: Implications 
for Law, Legal Advocacy, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119, 1124 (2006). 
 154. Id.; see also John T. Jost et al., Shared Reality, System Justification and the 
Relational Basis of Ideological Beliefs, 2 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 171, 172 
(2007) (“[P]eople defend and bolster the legitimacy of the societal status quo following 
exposure to various manipulations of system threat.”). 
GENETICS, RACE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 375 
system-justifying attitudes, as “acceptance of traditional distinctions tend to 
reduce cognitive dissonance.”155 
The psychological and moral need to reconcile pervasive racial 
disparities with the comforting perception of racial transcendence and 
absolution, as expressed through colorblindness and post-racialism, also 
serves to redeem whiteness.  Professor Sumi Cho has described racial 
redemption as “the process by which whiteness can be restored to its full 
material value by removing the encumbrances that the legacy of racism has 
placed upon it.”156  Whereas the acknowledgement of structural racism and 
white privilege “infringed upon the normative value of whiteness,” the 
modern move towards post-racialism redeems whiteness while insulating 
racial privilege from critique.157 
III.  The New Race Science 
The cognitive-moral dissonance that arises when an ostensibly “equal” 
and free society acquiesces in the existence of racial inequality has been 
historically mediated in both race-regarding and race-neutral ways.  
Initially, the artifice of “race” itself developed as a socio-political tool to 
justify the unequal treatment of persons living within a democratically 
equal society on the grounds of biological inferiority.158  Following the 
rejection of race as biologically meaningful in the morbid aftermath of 
World War II, the full weight of the physical and social sciences embraced 
a socio-political construction of race.  American society was thus no longer 
able, at least as a formal legal matter, to justify racial disparities on the 
basis of genetic inferiority.  Rather, postwar America was forced to 
acknowledge that racial inequality was caused by pervasive structural 
racism and discrimination.  Partly as a result, society was able to strike 
down many barriers to de jure racial equality during the emergent Civil 
Rights Era.  Utilizing race-regarding legal measures, such as the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, Brown desegregation, and affirmative action policy, 
                                                                                                     
 155. See Sundquist, supra note 148, at 148. 
 156. Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, 
Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73, 122 (1998). 
 157. Cho, supra note 120, at 1596 (explaining that colorblind and post-racial attitudes 
changes the meaning of race in politics). 
 158. See supra Part I.  
376 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 341 (2014) 
society thus enjoyed substantial (though incomplete) progress on race 
matters. 
The gains of the Civil Rights Era, however, gradually diminished as 
race-regarding legal responses to inequality and discrimination were 
displaced by race-neutral responses.  Colorblind and post-racial 
methodologies have been relatively successful in their attempts to 
rationalize continuing racial inequality in race-neutral terms, utilizing the 
language of “equal opportunity” and cultural inferiority.  And yet during 
this period of race-neutrality, marked by white “exhaustion” over race, we 
have witnessed glaring increases in racial disparities rather than decreases. 
Perhaps one of the more important consequences of the colorblind and 
post-race project has been the demise of the Civil Rights Movement.  A 
brief review of the most recent Supreme Court term is telling in this regard, 
where the Court rolled back critical civil rights advances in the voting 
discrimination, affirmative action, employer discrimination and criminal 
justice contexts.  During the summer of 2013, the Court held the most vital 
section of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.159  Declaring that “[o]ur 
country has changed,” the majority deployed the post-racial trope of “racial 
progress” to invalidate the centerpiece legislation of the Civil Rights Era.160  
States previously under federal review have already begun to implement 
rigid voting requirements that likely will have the effect of disenfranchising 
scores of minority voters.161  The Court also made it much more difficult for 
educational institutions to consider race in admissions,162 despite disturbing 
patterns of re-segregation and increasing racial disparities in higher 
education.163  In a pair of Title VII cases, the Court issued rulings that made 
it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail on employment discrimination 
cases. 164  And finally, the Court held constitutional the forcible collection 
of DNA samples for persons merely arrested on suspicion of committing a 
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crime, despite the fact that such collection disparately impacts racial 
minorities.165 
The death of the Civil Rights Movement will almost certainly lead to 
further increases in racial inequality.166  And yet the continued exacerbation 
of racial disparities arguably threatens the post-race perception of racial 
transcendence.  It becomes more and more difficult to profess a post-racial 
belief in an equal society when racial disparities on nearly every social 
metric continue to widen.  Race-neutral rationalizations of inequality, such 
as class and cultural deficiency explanations, may no longer be sufficiently 
persuasive to relieve the cognitive dissonance generated by the increasingly 
dire “American dilemma.”  As such, we likely will see new forms of 
rationalization emerge from this complicated socio-cognitive milieu as the 
post-race narrative adapts to changing social patterns. 
A.  Post-Racialism and the New Race Science 
One such rationalization can be found in the troubling resurrection of 
biological conceptions of racial difference.  The long rejected notion that 
race has genetic meaning has been resuscitated in a variety of modern 
scientific, legal and social contexts.  From pharmacogenomics to forensic 
evidence, the folk allure of viewing race as an empirically sound biological 
category has surged at the same time that the allure of acknowledging 
structural discrimination has dwindled. 
In a perverse way, the rise of the new “race science” makes sense in 
light of the post-racial project.  A key feature of post-racialism is the 
rejection of systemic racism as an explanation for disparate racial 
outcomes.  And while flawed race-neutral explanations (such as cultural, 
class and market theories) have filled the void in the last few decades, the 
central justification of racial inequality for centuries has been biological 
difference.167  As Professor Roberts has explained: 
“[b]iological distinctions, seemingly validated by genomic science and 
technology, appear to explain why stark racial disparities persist despite 
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the abolition of official discrimination on the basis of race and despite 
most white American’s belief that racism has ceased to exist.”168 
In particular, modern biological theories of racial difference provide 
colorblind and post-race adherents with a seemingly morally defensible 
way to mediate the cognitive dissonance that arises when confronted with 
the reality of racial inequality.  Understanding racial inequality in biological 
terms allows a shift in moral responsibility for racial disparities from the 
state and individual to the market and biotechnology.169  In this way, the 
new race science naturalizes the existing social order, by making racial 
differences seem biologically rooted and unchangeable by social policy. 
Conveniently utilizing the same flawed racial categories developed 
during oft-maligned 19th century “race science” era, modern biological race 
theory has re-emerged as a tool to commoditize personal identity and racial 
difference.170  The market for private genetic ancestry testing has exploded, 
fueled by misleading claims that genetic testing can produce percentage 
breakdowns of race.171  The field of race-based medicine and 
pharmacogenomics has similarly become popular, involving the 
development and marketing of drugs by pharmaceutical companies for 
specific racial groups.172  And all the while, the use of race to secure patent 
protection in biotechnology development has expanded.173 
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The most troubling manifestation of biological race theory, however, 
has occurred in our state and federal courts.  It has now become 
commonplace for courts to admit racial genetic evidence against criminal 
defendants at trial.  For almost a decade, state and federal judges have 
routinely allowed racial DNA evidence that there is only a “1 in 40 million 
chance” that another “Hispanic-American” or “African-American” or 
“Caucasian” or “Native-American” or “Asian-American” or “Puerto-Rican” 
or “Caribbean-American” shares the same genetic profile as a criminal 
defendant.  The Supreme Court has at best ignored the shaky legal status of 
racial DNA evidence in its cases, and at worst has implicitly accepted its 
admission against criminal defendants.174 
B.  Racial DNA Evidence 
The forensic analysis of DNA samples to identify criminal perpetrators 
is increasingly important to law enforcement.  It has been almost twenty 
years since Congress first passed an act allowing the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) to develop a national DNA database, which was 
named the Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”).175  THE CODIS 
database went into operation in 1998, and allows both state and federal law 
enforcement agents to upload DNA profiles and search the database for a 
match to their crime-scene sample.  Congress thereafter passed the DNA 
Analysis Backlog Elimination Act in 2000, which compels persons 
convicted of particular federal crimes to submit a DNA sample for 
uploading to the CODIS database.176  As of May 2013, the CODIS database 
contained over 10,376,000 DNA profiles in its convicted offender index, 
1,515,800 arrestee profiles and 493,500 forensic profiles.177  The number of 
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DNA profiles contained in CODIS has doubled in less than five years,178 
and will likely continue to expand exponentially following the Supreme 
Court’s holding that state and federal officers can upload DNA samples 
taken from persons merely arrested on suspicion of a felony.179  The 
expansion of DNA databases has dire implications for racial justice, given 
the disparate representation of racial minorities in these databases.  By most 
estimates, the DNA profiles of African-Americans represent at least 40% of 
the profiles contained in the convicted offender database,180 even though 
African-Americans make up only 13.1% of the general population.  As 
Professor William C. Thompson observes, “[b]ecause there are racial, 
ethnic, and class disparities in the composition of databases, the risk of false 
incrimination will fall disproportionately on members of the included 
groups.”181 
All persons, with the exception of identical twins, possess a unique 
molecular signature that can be determined through DNA analysis.182  
While it is currently both too time-consuming and expensive to map out the 
entire genome of an individual for criminal identification purposes, 
scientists have identified specific chromosomal regions of the genome that 
differ from person to person.183  The comparison of the genetic profile 
created from a DNA sample found at a crime scene with the genetic profile 
created from a suspect’s DNA sample is, thus, of obvious importance to 
both criminal investigators and prosecutors.  The determination of a 
“match” or “inclusion” between the compared genetic profiles does not 
represent conclusive evidence of identification, given that the individual’s 
entire genome has not been analyzed.184  Rather, a DNA match establishes 
that a suspect potentially could have contributed the DNA sample found at 
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a crime scene.185  The crucial next step of the DNA identification process 
therefore involves creating a probability estimate of the possibility that 
someone other than the suspect was the source of the crime-scene DNA 
sample.186 
The development of the “random match” probability estimate depends 
on determining the frequency with which the particular DNA profile 
appears in a given population.  One method of determining the probability 
of a random match is to analyze how often the DNA profile at issue appears 
in the entire population.  After comparing the DNA profile at issue to the 
entirety of the profiles contained in such a “general population” database, 
the scientist could then benignly opine that there is, for instance, a “1 in 1 
million chance” that some person other than the suspect shares the same 
DNA profile.187   The presentation of such expert opinion evidence at trial 
does not rely on biological assumptions of race whatsoever, as the 
frequency estimate is developed without regard to race. 
While the creation of a probability estimate using a general population 
database is generally scientifically and legally sound, forensic scientists and 
prosecutors have nonetheless been successful in admitting race-based 
probability estimates in criminal trials.  This alternative method of 
probability analysis involves measuring the frequency with which the DNA 
profile at issue appears in a given “racial” group.  While the genetic profiles 
uploaded to the CODIS database are typically not classified by race, some 
twenty years ago the FBI created a separate population file that estimated 
genetic frequencies in sub-populations according to the entrenched racial 
taxonomy: African-American, “United States” Caucasian, Hispanic, Far 
East Asian, and Native-American.188   This allows prosecution experts to 
present a racialized DNA probability estimate in criminal trials.  My own 
research indicates that the presentation of racialized DNA probability 
estimates at trial exceeds the presentation of estimates making comparisons 
to the general population. 
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C.  Debunking the Myth of Genetic Race 
Why have biological assumptions of race seeped into our criminal 
law?  Why do forensic experts and criminal prosecutors choose to present 
racial DNA evidence at trial when they could just as easily present non-
raced DNA evidence with the same degree of evidential force?  As 
discussed previously, the burgeoning acceptance of racial DNA evidence 
can be traced to the larger post-racial project.  The resurrection of 
biological understandings of race—such as the assumption that science can 
empirically create genetic probability estimates of race—normalizes the 
racial status quo and explains the persistence of racial disparities.  Simply 
put, the new race science strengthens the post-race rationalization of racial 
inequality while displacing society’s moral responsibility to pursue race-
regarding social policy. 
It is not possible to underestimate the enduring folk appeal of 
understanding race in biological terms.  We are all deeply susceptible to 
culturally learned assumptions about race, and cultural attitudes continue to 
unconsciously shape the manner in which judges, prosecutors and scientists 
construct and interpret race.  The intoxicating allure of viewing racial 
distinctions as natural and biologically based is historically rooted to an 
often unconscious cognitive urge to legitimate the racial status quo.189  
What becomes of racial hierarchy and privilege, after all, if racial categories 
no longer exist?  Science has long been utilized to validate folk notions of 
the supposed “fixed” nature of race.190 
Beyond the historical and sociological critique of biological theories of 
race, see supra, the “science” underlying such conceptions is seriously 
flawed.  As an initial matter, the racial taxonomy relied on by the new “race 
science” eerily mirrors antiquated folk classifications created almost three 
hundred years ago.  For example, the racial DNA population file created by 
the FBI is based on familiar socio-political racial distinctions: African-
American, Caucasian, Hispanic, East Asian and Native-American.  Yet 
these categories are neither scientifically meaningful nor universally 
recognized.  The world exhibits a mind-numbingly wide range of racial 
conceptions, which do not always mirror the traditional racial taxonomy 
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adopted by the United States.  As discussed in Part One of this Article, 
scientists at various times in history have estimated the number of human 
“races” in the world to be as little as three and as many as two hundred.  
And while the FBI and our courts have incorrectly assumed that there has 
been some consensus on the meaning and number of each racial category, 
modern genetic studies continue to rely on conflicting assumptions 
regarding racial taxonomies.191  The very malleability of race in the global 
context undermines the claim that there is any legal or scientific basis for 
racially categorizing genetic samples.192  As the anthropological geneticists 
Lorena Madrigal and Guido Barbujani observe, “[i]f races are biological 
realities, they must be the same everywhere, whereas forensic race 
catalogues differ across countries.”193 
Furthermore, the vast majority of geneticists agree that race has no 
biological meaning.  Numerous studies have concluded that “allele 
frequency comparisons among human populations rarely show 
discontinuities that map onto racial boundaries” and that there is no 
scientific basis for racial classification schemes.194  Scientists have even 
established that the greatest genetic variation occurs within so-called racial 
population groups rather than as between races.195  Indeed, “there [is] no 
such thing as race” in genetics,196 as race is “a concept that signifies and 
symbolizes sociopolitical conflicts and interests in reference to different 
types of human bodies.”197  As the UNESCO Commission concluded 
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following World War II, race is “not so much a biological phenomenon as a 
social myth.”198 
The judiciary’s acceptance of genetic estimates of race in criminal 
trials is particularly troublesome in terms of scientific reliability.  In 
addition to the above critiques of biological race theory, the methodology 
underlying the development of racial probability estimates is wholly 
unreliable.  As discussed, there are two possible methods to calculate 
genomic frequency.  The first method counts the number of times that a 
particular DNA profile occurs in the general population, and then utilizes 
classic statistical principles to place upper and lower confidence limits on 
that estimate.  The “general population” DNA estimate thus using a 
“straight counting” methodology, and does not incorporate theoretical 
assumptions about the reference population.199 
The second method of calculating genomic frequencies involves 
applying theoretical principles developed in the field of population genetics, 
which would allow for the creation of genomic estimates for specific sub-
populations (such as races).  The tabulation of racial genetic estimates is 
premised on three central assumptions of population genetics: (1) 
application of the product rule, (2) the Hardy-Weinberg principle and (3) 
linkage-equilibrium principles.  A central step in developing a racial DNA 
estimate is the application of the product rule; that is, the multiplication of 
individual allele frequencies in a given DNA sample.  Population genetics 
provides that every “matching allele is assumed to provide statistically 
independent evidence, and [that] the frequencies of the individual alleles 
[may be] multiplied together to calculate [the] frequency of the complete 
DNA pattern.”200  A key assumption allowing the application of the product 
rule to estimate genomic frequencies, thus, is that the reference population 
does not contain sub-populations with distinct allele frequencies.  In other 
words, the reference population must be sufficiently homogeneous – where 
allele frequencies are similar or constant in order to apply the product rule. 
The Hardy-Weinberg principle allows geneticists to assume that 
genotype frequencies within a population remain in such constant 
equilibrium, unless there is reason to believe that the frequencies of a 
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population group was “acted on by one of the four evolutionary forces 
(mutation, selection, gene flow (or admixture), and drift).”201  Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium is not present, however, when either mating within 
the reference population is not random or migration occurs within the 
reference population.  And yet it seems clear “that mating is not random in 
most human populations, that some mating populations are not large, and 
that migration is variable among mating populations throughout the world.  
In fact, it is well accepted that the United States population is a mixture of 
people of various origins.”202  Given the overwhelming evidence that racial 
groups are not genetically homogeneous, the state of Hardy-Weinberg 
equilibrium is simply not achievable when creating racial probability 
estimates.203 
Racial DNA evidence is also scientifically unsound due to the lack of 
an empirical method to classify DNA samples by race.  Given that race is a 
social construct, the process of racial classification necessarily is dependent 
on a wide range of social variables- including skin color, phenotype, 
language, dress and performance.  And while racial categorization is often 
imposed on an individual by others in society, it is also a deeply personal 
question of identity formation.204  It does not appear, however, that any 
rigorous or consistent methodology is employed to classify racial DNA 
samples.  The expert witnesses and population geneticists that develop 
racialized DNA estimates for use at trial rarely, if ever, identify the 
protocols used to categorize genetic samples by race.205  It is likely that 
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to classify DNA samples.  See Madrigal & Barbujani, supra note 193, at 26 (collecting 
studies).  Other studies that rely on blood bank DNA samples seem to rely only on self-
reported race.  See, e.g., Peter M. Vallone, Amy E. Decker & John M. Butler, Allele 
Frequencies for 70 Autosomal SNP Loci with U.S. Caucasian, African-American and 
Hispanic Samples, 149 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 279 (2005). 
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many DNA samples are classified by race according to the self-reporting of 
the person providing the sample.206  This method of racial classification, 
however, is scientifically unreliable given the subjective nature of identity 
formation.  As I have previously described: 
[I]n the United states cultural attitudes towards hypodescent and the 
“one-drop” rule may lead many “light-skinned” African-Americans to 
identify as “black” even if they are “light, bright, and damn near white.”  
Similarly, evolving conceptions of race mean that there is no guarantee 
that a “mixed” person will automatically identify as non-white as 
opposed to white . . . Even if we disregard these not so extreme 
examples of racial identification, many persons who fit within a 
stereotypical racial phenotype likely have a mixed “racial” 
background.207 
Other DNA samples may be classified by race according to 
determinations made by outsider-reference.208  And yet adopting an “other-
ascribed” methodology is similarly lacking in scientific rigor, given that the 
protocols and process of categorizing a person by race is unclear in the 
racial DNA context.  As others have concluded, “[t]he process of assigning 
a racial label to DNA samples is too speculative, resting on an uneasy and 
often unspoken factual ground, to be deemed reliable.”209 
For these reasons, the offer of racial DNA evidence at trial must be 
rejected as scientifically unreliable under our rules of evidence.210  Such 
evidence should also be excluded at trial on the grounds of legal irrelevance 
and unfair prejudice.211  The presentation of racial probability estimates 
unfairly interjects race into a case, while failing to make the identification 
of a criminal perpetrator any “more probable or less probable” than if a 
                                                                                                     
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 550 (6th Cir. 1993) (“[B]y 
conducting DNA studies on FBI agents, the FBI has developed a table of DNA allele 
frequencies for each of three racial groups—caucasian, black and hispanic . . . .”). 
 207. See Science Fictions, supra note 169, at 90. 
 208. “Outsider-reference” refers to the process of allowing others to classify the race of 
a person, as opposed to relying on racial self-identification.  See Ford, supra note 204, at 
1239 (describing different methods of racial classification). 
 209. Science Fictions, supra note 169, at 91; see also ROBERTS, supra note 25, at 263 
(describing the “scientific flaws that plague racial phenotyping”). 
 210. See id. at 88–94 (explaining in detail why racial DNA evidence should be 
excluded on the basis of Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 402, 403 and 702). 
 211. See Science Fictions, supra note 169, at 91–94 (“Such evidence unnecessarily 
injects issues of race and ethnicity into the trial, thereby leading the trier of fact to 
improperly focus on the race of the defendant and, at times, victim.”). 
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general probability estimate were utilized.212  While I have previously 
demonstrated that racial DNA evidence is inadmissible under our existing 
rules of evidence,213 an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence would 
authoritatively exclude such evidence in our federal courts.  Such an 
amendment could take the following form: 
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 416 (“Racial DNA Evidence”):  
Evidence of a DNA random match probability estimate is not admissible 
in any civil or criminal case to the extent such evidence relies on a racial 
population database. 
An amendment to our federal procedural rules would thus result in a 
sea-change in the manner in which DNA probability evidence is received 
by federal courts.  Given the Erie doctrine, however, such an amendment to 
our federal statutory rules would do little to directly impact the 
admissibility of racial DNA evidence in state courts.214  While grass-root 
efforts to amend state evidentiary rules in each of the union’s fifty states 
would be commendable, there are broader constitutional reasons why such 
evidence should be excluded at trial.  As I will demonstrate in the following 
section, the substantive Due Process doctrine underlying the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, as informed by the Ninth Amendment, is violated 
whenever the State officially embraces genetic views on race.  In particular, 
I argue that such a practice violates the fundamental constitutional right to a 
shared humanity by placing State imprimatur on discredited notions of 
racial biological difference. 
IV.  Substantive Due Process and the Fundamental Right of Shared 
Humanity 
The government’s embrace of biological theories of race in the 
criminal justice context is not only wrongheaded as a scientific and 
sociological matter, but also violates its constitutional obligation to 
recognize the shared humanity of all its citizens.  The substantive due 
process doctrine underlying the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments prohibits 
                                                                                                     
 212. See id. (discussing the particular issues arising between race and DNA evidence). 
 213. See id. at 88–94 (illustrating the issue with racial DNA evidence); see generally 
Sundquist, supra note 75. 
 214. See Erie R.R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (establishing the jurisdictional 
principle that state courts may develop their own procedural rules). 
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the government from engaging in a genetic racial taxonomy which 
undermines the democratic principle that “all persons are created equal.”  
At its core, the substantive due process doctrine establishes a fundamental 
respect for the shared humanity of all of society’s members.  The practice 
of placing State imprimatur on discredited concepts of racial biological 
difference violates this norm of shared humanity in that it infringes upon 
the constitutional “right to define one’s own concept of existence . . . 
and . . . personhood.”215 
Charting the often rocky waters of the substantive due process doctrine 
can prove to be a frustrating process.  The indeterminate nature of the 
doctrine is much lamented, owing largely to the failure of the Court to 
adopt a single coherent theory of decision-making.216  And yet the “vague 
contours of the Due Process Clause do not leave us . . . without adequate 
guides” to ascertain which “personal immunities” are “so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”217 
As Justice Frankfurter has observed: 
In dealing not with the machinery of government but with human rights, 
the absence of formal exactitude, or want of fixity of meaning, is not an 
unusual or even regrettable attribute of constitutional provisions.218 
The identification of fundamental rights protected by the substantive 
due process doctrine has typically been guided by appeals either to history, 
                                                                                                     
 215. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
 216. See, e.g., Daniel O. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C. 
L. REV. 63, 63 (2006) (“Substantive due process is in serious disarray, with the Supreme 
Court simultaneously embracing two, and perhaps three, competing and inconsistent theories 
of decisionmaking.”); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process 
Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 499–510 (2010) (describing the different methods of 
interpretation that substantive due process analysis yields); RHONDA WASSERMAN, 
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 210 
(2004) (describing the Court’s inconsistency in invoking substantive due process); EDWARD 
KEYNES, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, & PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE 
PROCESS (2004) (“Since the late 1880s, the Supreme Court has flirted with substantive due 
process, sometimes affirming, at other times rejecting, the due process clauses as a restraint 
on the exercise of legislative power.”). 
 217. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 87, 105 (1934)). 
 218. Id. (“Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, 
and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions 
cannot be brought about by methods that offend ‘a sense of justice.’”). 
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“reasoned judgment,” or evolving social values.219  While the use of 
multiple theories of decision-making have led to inconsistent and 
conflicting results at times, each of these jurisprudential methods supports 
the finding of a fundamental right of shared humanity in the racial genetics 
context. 
A.  Historical Tradition and Substantive Due Process 
The historical interpretive method accords substantive due process 
protection to those fundamental rights that are “deeply rooted in this 
Nation’s history and tradition.”220  While the historical doctrinal approach is 
clearly conservative in nature, it should be distinguished from strict 
originalist theory in that “framers’ intent” and “original meaning” are not 
the sole constitutional touchstones for decision-making.  Rather, the 
historical method locates the “appropriate limits on substantive due 
process” through an examination of “the teachings of history [and] solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.”221 
The Court has employed the historical method at various moments in 
its jurisprudence, at times reaching conclusions that would shock modern 
sensibilities.  For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick222 the Court applied an 
extremely narrow version of the historical method to uphold a state statute 
criminalizing certain sexual activities engaged in by same sex persons.223  
The Court refused to recognize a substantive due process right to engage in 
private sexual conduct, relying on a distorted view of history to find that no 
right to engage in “homosexual sodomy” had been historically 
recognized.224  Some seventeen years later the Court in Lawrence v. 
Texas225 overruled Bowers, finding that Bowers Court had improperly 
                                                                                                     
 219. See generally Conkle, supra note 216 (evaluating these three theories of 
substantive due process). 
 220. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)). 
 221. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (quoting Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 222. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191 (holding that homosexual sodomy was not a 
fundamental liberty protected by the Constitution). 
 223. See id. at 194–97 (upholding the Georgia statute). 
 224. See id. at 192–94 (“[T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is ‘deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ is 
at best, facetious.”). 
 225. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 560 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute, 
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framed the right at issue through an unduly narrow and selective reading of 
history.226  The Lawrence Court applied a more nuanced historical method 
to identify a fundamental right to engage in private sexual conduct, noting 
that “‘history and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the 
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”227 
An earlier iteration of the historical method appeared in the Court’s 
decision in Moore v. City of East Cleveland.228  In Moore, the Court 
recognized a substantive due process right of an extended family to reside 
together while invalidating a housing ordinance that limited residential 
occupancy to nuclear families.229  Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, 
identified the existence of such a fundamental right by reference to the 
American historical tradition of non-nuclear family members sharing a 
household together.230  Powell noted that such a historical tradition reflected 
“the accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over centuries and honored 
throughout our history.”231 
The historical tradition underlying the development of modern 
substantive due process doctrine strongly and clearly supports the finding of 
a fundamental right to shared humanity in the racial genetics context.  
While earlier versions of substantive due process arguably pre-date the 
Civil War Amendments, it is without question that the Fourteenth 
Amendment has distinctly informed modern doctrine.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in a post-Civil War historical context, where the 
“primary focus of the framers was on equality [of African-Americans] 
under the law.”232  That the substantive protections of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                     
prohibiting intimate sexual conduct between two persons of the same sex, “furthers no 
legitimate state interest” and is therefore unconstitutional). 
 226. See id. at 578 (“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct 
today.  It ought not to remain binding precedent, it should now be overruled.”) 
 227. Id. at 572 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 228. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 229. See id. at 503 (recognizing that the United States Constitution “protects the 
sanctity of family precisely because the institution of family is deeply rooted in the Nation’s 
history and tradition”).  
 230. See id. (“The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents 
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally 
deserving of constitutional recognition.”).  
 231. Id. 
 232. See WASSERMAN, supra note 216, at 9 (discussing the racial equality motivations 
behind the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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Amendment were designed to promote the legal equality of African-
Americans is beyond the pale:  As Senator Jacob Howard explained in 
testimony to the Senate at the time of ratification, the due process clause 
was intended “to protect the black man in his fundamental rights as a 
citizen with the same shield which it throws over the white man.”233  A 
critical focus, then, of the substantive due process protections of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is racial equality, given that the Postwar 
Amendments “were adopted to repair the nation from the damage slavery 
had caused.”234 
The damage caused by slavery was not limited to enslavement itself or 
de jure legal inequality.  As previously noted in Part I of this Article, the 
damage wrought by slavery was enabled by biological theories of racial 
difference.  Such “pseudo-science” rationalized the unequal treatment of 
non-white persons as a social, religious and legal matter.235  At its core, the 
Fourteenth Amendment disrupted this slavery narrative by emphasizing the 
shared humanity of all citizens. 
The recognition of a fundamental right to shared humanity in 
substantive due process doctrine is also strongly supported by the long-
standing “teachings of history [and a] solid recognition of the basic values 
that underlie our society.”236  It is difficult to imagine a tradition that is 
more ingrained in our recent history than the understanding that race is a 
social construct, devoid of biological meaning.  From the UNESCO 
Statement on Race following the Second World War to the countless 
findings of sociologists and state and federal courts, our society has 
historically affirmed our democratic belief in shared humanity by 
                                                                                                     
 233. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).  Representative Thaddeus 
Stevens also emphasized the goal of African-American equality: “Whatever means of 
redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to all.  Whatever law allows the white man to 
testify in court shall allow the man of color to do the same.  These are great advantages over 
their present codes . . . . Now color disqualifies a man from testifying in courts, or being 
tried in the same way as white men.”  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). 
 234. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); see also David H. Gans, The Unitary Fourteenth Amendment, 56 EMORY L.J. 
907, 932–33 (2007) (“Slavery dictated the roles slaves could serve . . . . [while] [t]he 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . [gave] them all the rights inherent in citizenship and 
empower[ed] them to make decisions about the roles they would play in a reconstructed 
nation.”). 
 235. See Sundquist, supra note 166, at 62 (forthcoming 2014); Sundquist, supra note 
74, at 238–241 (discussing the justifications used to support disparate treatment of 
individuals based upon race). 
 236. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
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embracing sociological understandings of race.  The “historical tradition” of 
viewing race as a socio-political construction “has roots [which are] 
deserving of constitutional recognition,” in that it reflects “the accumulated 
wisdom of civilization, gained over the [decades] and honored throughout 
our history.”237  The historical method therefore supports the identification 
of a fundamental right to shared humanity, which is violated by laws or 
practices that reify genetic racial distinctions. 
B.  Substantive Due Process and Reasoned Judgment 
Substantive rights are also identified by the Court through a process of 
“reasoned judgment,”238 whereby the weight of the asserted liberty interest 
is evaluated through political-moral reasoning.239  The due process 
protections of the 5th and 14th amendments have been interpreted under this 
methodology to provide a range of un-enumerated substantive liberty rights, 
including the right to make a choice regarding abortion,240 the right to 
sexual and contraceptive privacy,241 and the right to personal autonomy and 
personhood.242  The “reasoned judgment” interpretive method tends to 
                                                                                                     
 237. Id. at 505.  
 238. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 982 (1992). 
 239. See Conkle, supra note 216, at 98–99 (discussing the evolving conception of the 
role of substantive due process). Professor Conkle describes the “reasoned judgment” 
method in great detail in his Article. In particular, Professor Conkle summarizes the 
“reasoned judgment” approach as a method through which the Court “should itself evaluate 
the liberty interest of the individual and weigh it against competing governmental concerns, 
determining on this basis whether the liberty interest deserves protection as a constitutional 
right.” Ronald Dworkin has further described the “reasoned judgment” method as requiring 
judges to refer to their “own views about political morality” in order to “find the best 
conception of constitutional moral principles…that fits the broad story of America’s 
historical record.” (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3–4, 11 (1996)). 
 240. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding that the state law, which 
criminalized abortion “without regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the 
other interests involved,  [violated] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”) 
 241. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965) (finding that Connecticut 
statute which banned contraceptives invoked questions of Due Process); see also Casey, 505 
U.S. at 982 (1992) (recognizing Fourteenth Amendment interpreted method as “reasoned 
judgment”); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (recognizing the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s “right to privacy” included “independence in making certain kinds 
of important decisions” such as “procreation [and] contraception”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (citing Griswold in concluding that statute which prohibited 
distribution of birth control to single individuals was unconstitutional). 
 242. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 983–84 (discussing the “notions of personal autonomy” 
 
GENETICS, RACE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 393 
frame the liberty interest protected by substantive due process as one 
implicating “the autonomy of the person,”243 “personal dignity,”244 or “self-
definition.”245 
The Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey was the first to label this 
interpretive method as one involving “reasoned judgment,” although earlier 
cases clearly had engaged in similar political-moral philosophizing to 
identify substantive due process rights.  Prior to the Casey decision, the 
Court in its landmark Roe v. Wade “recognized the right of a woman to 
make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny” in striking down 
a Texas law which prohibited abortions.246  In its evaluation of the liberty 
interest at stake, the Court reasoned that the “right of privacy . . . is broad 
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.”247  In its weighing of the relevant liberty and governmental 
interests, the Roe Court relied in part on the political-moral reasoning 
adopted in its earlier Griswold v. Connecticut248 and Eisenstadt v. Baird249 
cases.  In both Griswold and Eisenstadt the Court invalidated state laws that 
prohibited either the use or distribution of contraceptives.  The Griswold 
Court framed the liberty interest protected by substantive due process as “a 
right to privacy” on marital issues.250  The Eisenstadt case, decided on equal 
protection grounds, extended the Griswold rationale to non-marital 
relationships.251  The Court held that the state prohibition on contraceptives 
to unmarried persons violated a “fundamental human right” based in 
                                                                                                     
underlying the Court’s reasoning in Roe v. Wade); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 559 (2003) (recognizing the Fourteen Amendment Due Process Clause expends 
protection to some “personal decisions”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) 
(observing the constitutional guarantee of certain “personal liberties” found to be “rooted in 
the traditions of conscience of our people”). 
 243. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 983–84 (1992). 
 244. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 245. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 246. Frank August Schubert, Introduction to Law and the Legal System  67 (10th ed. 
2012). 
 247. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 248. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1985). 
 249. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 250. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (concluding that the “right to privacy” in the marital 
context is “as noble [in] purpose as any” prior rights found protected by Due Process). 
 251. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (mirroring the reasoning in Griswold to conclude, 
where probation on contraceptives within the marital relationship violated Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process, a statute which prohibited access of such contraceptives to only 
single individuals must also be unconstitutional). 
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privacy and liberty.252  The Court elaborated that “if the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free 
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”253 
These political-moral considerations on the meaning of “liberty” and 
“privacy” greatly influenced the Court’s later holding in the Casey decision.  
In Casey, the Court reaffirmed the “central holding” in Roe v. Wade254 
while invalidating portions of a Pennsylvania statute, which restricted the 
availability of abortion.255  In a case perhaps best representative of 
“reasoned judgment” analysis, the Court in Casey attempted a grand 
“explication of [the meaning of the] individual liberty” interests protected 
by substantive due process.256  The Court philosophized that: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood 
were they formed under compulsion of the State.257 
The Court’s interpretation of liberty as involving a fundamental right 
of personal autonomy and self-definition was extended in the Lawrence v. 
Texas case.258  In Lawrence, the Court overruled its prior decision in 
Bowers v. Hardwick while invalidating a Texas statute, which criminalized 
same-sex sexual conduct.259  The Court framed the liberty interests 
protected by substantive due process as those involving “the autonomy of 
the person” and “personal dignity.”260  In determining that the Texas statute 
impermissibly intruded upon the fundamental liberty rights of same sex 
                                                                                                     
 252. Id. at 445. 
 253. Id. at 453. 
 254. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (finding that a state law which made it a 
crime to procure or attempt an abortion except for purpose of saving life of mother violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protecting the “right to privacy”).  
 255. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (noting that advances 
in medical technology which may have “overtaken” some of Roe’s factual assumptions has 
“no bearing on the validity of [the Court’s] central holding). 
 256. See id. at 853 (referencing the court’s prior discussion of “individual liberty” as a 
reason not to part from the central holding of Roe v. Wade).  
 257. Id. at 851.  
 258. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 259. See id. at 578 (finding that “Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and is 
not correct today” based upon notions that Homosexuals “right to liberty” entitled them to 
engage in sexual intercourse within the privacy of their bedroom).  
 260. Id. at 574. 
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persons, the Court reasoned that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self 
that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”261 
The “reasoned judgment” interpretive method provides perhaps the 
strongest support for recognizing a fundamental right of shared humanity 
when applied to the racial genetics context.  The validation of biological 
theories of race by the State clearly undermines the “dignity” and 
“autonomy of the person,” in light of the historical use of “race science” to 
promote notions of non-white racial inferiority.  Just as it would clearly be 
constitutionally suspect for the State to support de jure racially segregated 
public schools,262 so too would it be unconstitutional for the State to 
embrace biological classifications of race which resurrect the “badges and 
incidents of slavery.”263 
The government’s promotion of racial genetic evidence in the criminal 
justice context also undercuts the fundamental “right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.”264  The Court’s recent jurisprudence demonstrates that 
substantive due process, at its core, protects the ability of individuals to 
define and exercise their personal identity free of government 
compulsion.265  The formation of one’s racial identity, in particular, is a 
deeply personal and private process.266  The presentation and admission of 
racial genetics evidence constrains an individual’s choice to reject 
                                                                                                     
 261. Id. at 562.  
 262. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (invalidating racial 
segregation of public schools under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution). 
 263. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (explaining that the 
purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment was to “abolish the badges and incidents of slavery”).  
 264. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003). 
 265. See id. at 562 (finding that “liberty presumes [individual] autonomy” as protected 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685–86 (1977) (phrasing liberty as necessitating “choice[]” 
regarding contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 168 (1973) (framing “liberty” under 
Due Process Clause as assuring certain “freedoms”); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 869 (1992) (framing the “constitutional liberty” as “freedom” to terminate pregnancy); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454 (1972) (finding a protection for single individuals 
right to chose to access contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) 
(preserving martial privacy and the ability for individuals to make choices within the privacy 
of the marital relationship). 
 266. See, e.g., OMI ET AL., supra note 26, at 12–13 (discussing the way in which society 
“utilize[s] race to provide clues to who a person is”). 
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biological racial classifications.  The embrace of racial genetics evidence by 
the State damages the “racial dignity” of non-white persons by providing de 
jure status to rejected notions of racial difference and inferiority.267  Similar 
to the questions of “personal dignity” at issue in Lawrence, Roe, and 
Eisenstadt, an individual’s “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the 
State.”268 
C.  Substantive Due Process and Evolving Communal Values 
The final method used by the Court to identify fundamental rights 
protected by the substantive due process doctrine involves an appreciation 
of evolving social values.  While President Obama famously referred to his 
perspective on same-sex marriage as “evolving” just a few years ago, the 
Court has a much longer history of giving due weight to shifting public 
values on important social issues.269  Whereas the historical interpretive 
method locates protected interests solely from an examination of “deeply 
rooted” social and legal history, the evolving values theory focuses instead 
on “whether the asserted individual right has broad contemporary support in 
the national culture.”270 
The landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas provides the freshest and 
most concrete example of the Court’s reliance on the “evolving values” 
method in identifying rights protected by the substantive due process 
doctrine.  As noted previously, the Court in Lawrence struck down a Texas 
statute that criminalized same-sex conduct on the ground that the law 
                                                                                                     
 267. Professor Anthony V. Alfieri has written extensively on the concept of “racial 
dignity.” He describes racial dignity as: “the physical and psychological integrity of self, 
experienced as an interior sense of worth and as an exterior acknowledgement of respect.  
Dignity confers self-esteem and the esteem of others outside the self.  Equality here relates 
to the outward egalitarian treatment of the self by others, whether private individuals and 
groups, or public agents and institutions of the state.” Anthony V. Alfieri, Prosecuting Race, 
48 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1163 (1999); see also Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of 
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935, 949 (1999) (referring to the “dominant visions of racial 
dignity and community in American law”); Anthony V. Alfieri, Race Trials, 76 TEX. L. REV. 
1293, 1294 (1998) (suggesting an attempt to “reconfigure race trials by reconstructing racial 
identity, reimagining racialized narrative, and reforming race-neutral representation”). 
 268. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
 269. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003); see also Rochin v. California, 
342 U.S. 165 (1952); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 270. Daniel Conkle, supra note 216, at 128 (observing that “[t]his contemporary 
support might be a continuation of longstanding historical tradition”). 
GENETICS, RACE AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 397 
violated the fundamental liberty rights of same-sex persons.271  While the 
Court relied heavily on a “reasoned judgment” analysis in reaching its 
holding, it also paid strong attention to shifting socio-political conceptions 
of the legal protections which extend to same-sex persons.  Whereas the 
overruled Bowers Court primarily rested its despicable ruling on an 
acceptance of society’s history of bias and prejudice towards same-sex 
relationships, the Lawrence Court indicated that an understanding of 
modern social values could better inform its decision-making.  The Court 
reasoned that “[i]n all events we think that our laws and traditions in the 
past half century are of most relevance” when identifying fundamental 
rights protected by the substantive due process doctrine.272  Following an 
extensive review of recent judicial and legislative action on same-sex 
rights, the Court found that an “emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”273 
Notwithstanding the current scientific and legal trend to treat race as a 
distinct biological category, it is clear that an appreciation of the evolving 
social values on race during the “past half century” support a finding that 
substantive due process protects individuals from racial biological 
ascriptions imposed the State.  The social and legal recognition that race 
was a purely social construction was largely influenced by post World War 
II developments.274  Stunned by the atrocities enabled by biological 
conceptions of race, the newly formed United Nations issued a definitive 
statement as to the sociological nature of race.275  Since that time, the 
scientific consensus on race has overwhelmingly reaffirmed that race is not 
born in our genes, but rather is socially and politically constructed.  Our 
courts and legislatures have similarly embraced a sociological 
understanding of race during the last fifty years, dismissing biological racial 
theories as “arbitrary” and recognizing that race is “for the most part 
sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature.”276  Modern social attitudes 
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on race have also evolved to understand race in social constructionist 
terms.277 
Remarkably, even key defenders of racial population genetics and 
racial DNA evidence acknowledge that race is a social construction.  For 
example, the National Research Council admitted that “race is 
meaningless” and that racial “definitions are to some extent arbitrary” while 
it nonetheless advocated for the use of race-based DNA databases.278  The 
same courts that routinely allow racial DNA evidence against criminal 
defendants similarly reach judicial findings regarding the sociological 
nature of race.279  What can account for such schizophrenic and conflicted 
thinking on the nature of race?  One answer lies in recognizing the weight 
of our past racial legacies on cognitive understandings of race and 
prejudice.  Despite conclusive scientific findings on the social nature of 
race, folk notions of biological racial difference continue to both 
consciously and unconsciously influence our perceptions on race.  These 
lingering, although non-empirical, assumptions of racial difference impact 
both scientific and judicial reasoning, often at an unconscious level.280 
D.  The Evidentiary Dimension of Substantive Due Process 
The substantive due process doctrine protects not only against 
legislative and executive actions that undermine individual fundamental 
rights, but also against the judicial admission of evidence against criminal 
defendants which offend “a sense of justice” and “decency.”281  The actions 
by the judiciary, as State actors, are subject to the same constitutional 
limitations as the actions of the executive and legislature.  The Court’s 
celebrated case in Rochin v. California demonstrates the manner in which 
substantive due process applies to the evidentiary context.282 
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In Rochin, the Court held that the admission of illegally obtained 
evidence during a criminal trial violated the substantive due process rights 
of the defendant.283  The facts of the case should be well familiar to most 
students of the substantive due process doctrine.  State police officers 
entered the defendant’s house in order to investigate rumored drug selling 
activity.284  After forcing Rochin’s bedroom door open, they discovered the 
defendant sitting on his bed next to his wife, as well as two suspicious 
capsules resting on top of a nightstand.285  Rochin immediately swallowed 
the capsules after the police officers questioned him about the drugs.286  
Following a struggle, the officers attempted in vain to extract the capsules 
from Rochin’s mouth.287  Rochin was then handcuffed and taken to a 
hospital, where the police officers instructed a doctor to force “an emetic 
solution through a tube into Rochin’s stomach against his will.”288  Rochin 
then vomited the capsules, which were later determined to contain 
morphine.289  Rochin was thereafter charged and convicted of illegal drug 
possession.290  The principal evidence against Rochin was the two vomited 
capsules, which were admitted at trial into evidence over Rochin’s 
objections.291 
The Court found that the admission of the seized drug evidence at trial 
violated the substantive due process rights of the criminal defendant.292  
Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, observed that the limitations of 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments “concern not restrictions upon 
the powers of the States to define crime… but restrictions upon the manner 
in which States may enforce their penal codes.”293  As a result, the 
substantive due process clause “inescapably imposes upon this Court an 
exercise of judgment upon the whole course of the proceedings (resulting in 
a conviction) in order to ascertain whether they offend those canons of 
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-
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speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous 
offenses.”294  The Court further defined substantive “[d]ue process of law 
[as] a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal 
immunities which, as Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are ‘so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental,’ or are ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”295  
Applying these standards to the facts in the case, the Court found that the 
admission of evidence obtained through methods which “shocks the 
conscience” violated the defendant’s due process rights.  The Court 
reasoned that allowing the admission of such evidence would “offend the 
community’s sense of fair play and decency.”296 
Strikingly similar to the Rochin case, the admission of racial DNA 
evidence against a criminal defendant violates the “canons of decency and 
fairness” which give meaning to the substantive due process doctrine.  As 
Justice Frankfurter concluded for the Court, our due process protections 
require that “convictions [are not] brought about by methods that offend ‘a 
sense of justice’” or that have the potential to “discredit law and thereby to 
brutalize the temper of a society.”297  The admission of racial DNA 
evidence “offends a sense of justice” and violates “canons of decency and 
fairness” by placing State imprimatur on dangerous notions of biological 
racial difference.  The routine admission of racial DNA evidence by state 
and federal courts not only runs afoul of traditional and evolving values 
concerning the nature of race, but violates the criminal defendant’s 
fundamental right of shared humanity.  Such a right protects against 
governmental actions, which deny the humanity and dignity of individuals 
by imposing a biological racial taxonomy to scientific evidence. 
The imposition of biological racial distinctions undermines the 
essential humanity protected by substantive due process by rendering non-
white persons something less than human.  Biological race theories have 
been developed and/or used throughout every moment in history to 
dehumanize non-white persons, thereby rationalizing unequal social and 
legal treatment.298  The acceptance of biological racial distinctions by the 
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State must be viewed against this historical record.  And while racial DNA 
evidence does not explicitly define non-white persons as less than human, 
the admission of such evidence promotes disturbing assumptions of racial 
difference and inferiority.  As previously discussed, the admission of racial 
DNA evidence also undermines an individual’s “right to define one’s own 
concept of existence” and “personal dignity.”299  Such taxonomies of race 
have absolutely no place in our science or public consciousness, much less 
our courts of law. 
E.  The Absence of Compelling Government Interests 
The Court in Washington v. Glucksberg300 adopted a fairly mechanical 
framework for analyzing substantive due process, holding that the doctrine 
does not come into play unless (1) a fundamental liberty interest has been 
violated by State action and (2) the state action was not rationally related to 
compelling government interests.  While the articulation of a fundamental 
right to a shared humanity has been the principal focus of this Article, it is 
also clear that the admission of racial DNA evidence at trial is not rationally 
related to legitimate government interests. 
There are simply no legitimate government interests that support the 
re-inscription of biological racial distinctions.  The admission of a 
racialized genetic probability estimate at trial promotes neither the accuracy 
nor the fairness of a trial.  A purported state interest in evidentiary 
relevance and reliability must therefore fail, as non-racial DNA evidence 
possesses similar guarantees of probative force without the dangers of 
prejudice and unreliability associated with racial DNA evidence.301  The 
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence has endorsed this 
approach, and recommends that racial DNA databases be replaced with a 
single general population database to develop probability estimates.302 
Substantive due process doctrine protects “against government 
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests,” such as 
the newly articulated right to a shared humanity.  The State places an undue 
burden on the exercise of that right when it admits racial DNA evidence at 
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trial, notwithstanding the absence of any legitimate government interest in 
such evidence.303 
V.  Conclusion 
The scientific and judicial trend to view race in biological terms raises 
the troubling specter of a modern “Race Science.”  The danger in ascribing 
to biological theories of race lies not only in its potential to resurrect 
discarded notions of racial difference and inferiority, but in that it denies a 
person’s “right to define one’s own concept of existence” and racial 
identity.  The admission of racial DNA evidence at trial thus undermines 
the very heart of the liberty and personal dignity protected by substantive 
due process. 
The concept of “race” was contrived to resolve the moral dilemma that 
arises when a society commits to liberal equality and yet still suffers from 
group-based social inequality.  The notion of “biological racial difference” 
historically has been deployed to rationalize the persistence (and 
exacerbation) of such social disparities, as well as the unequal socio-legal 
treatment of persons deemed “non-white.”  Notwithstanding the resounding 
rejection of biological theories of race following the Second World War, 
our society has strained to disavow moral responsibility for past and 
continuing racial disparities.  Rather, our society has justified the 
persistence of racial inequality using various race-neutral conceptual 
mechanisms, including colorblind constitutionalism, culture of poverty 
theories, equal opportunity rhetoric, and post-racialism. 
The emergence of modern biological race theory, in this light, reflects 
our continuing struggle to take account of “the problem of the color line.”304  
The moral and cognitive desire of many to be blind to race, to normalize 
inequality, to believe in a world of racial transcendence and absolution, is 
furthered by genetic explanations for racial difference.   The State should 
play no role in perpetuating post-racial ideology, and certainly should not 
lend its official imprimatur on the admission of racial genetic evidence at 
trial.  Given that race is devoid of biological meaning, such evidence not 
only must be excluded on the statutory grounds of irrelevance, unreliability 
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and unfair prejudice, but for constitutional reasons fundamental to our 
democratic society. 
At the core of our constitutional guarantees is recognition of the shared 
equality and humanity of all persons.  Our substantive due process doctrine, 
in particular, protects the ability of individuals to define their own 
understanding of existence and personhood without government 
interference.  The government practice of presenting and admitting 
evidence of genetic racial taxonomies against criminal defendants violates 
this fundamental right to a shared humanity.  The admission of racial 
genetic evidence is not supported by this country’s deeply rooted values, 
and conflicts with the racial justice focus of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Furthermore, evolving understandings of the constructionist nature of race 
demonstrate that the substantive due process doctrine protects against racial 
biological ascriptions imposed by the State.  Such a practice by the State 
inevitably resurrects the ugly ghost of 19th Century “race science,” and with 
it the prospect that biological racial difference will once again be used to 
rationalize inequality.  Recognition of a fundamental right to a shared 
humanity accords not only with the history, purpose and goals of 
substantive due process, but with the broader equality aspirations of our 
democratic society. 
  
